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GLISTRUP SUPPORT FALLING OFF AMONG PARTY FAITHFUL

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 7 Jul 79 p 14

[Article by Lisbeth Knudsen]

[Text] Only if several different groups within the Progress Party's Folketing delegation unite to take the power away from Mogens Glistrup, the party's founder and leader, can the great clash in the party and a possible party split come about by September.

A special group organized outside of the Folketing delegation guarantees Glistrup support in advance for a new party if the split should become a reality in connection with the national party congress of 29-30 September. Meanwhile Mogens Glistrup seems inclined to wait and see whether the various groups within the Folketing delegation will unite in protest against his party leadership, and more particularly whether they can find support at the congress. If there is very sharp criticism at the congress of Glistrup and his utterances in recent months, he will presumably choose to start a new party.

While Mogens Glistrup is on a vacation trip to England and later taking part in a congress of the World Anticommunist League in Taiwan, work is going on in the various groups within the Folketing delegation in preparation for what is to happen in the fall, both at a summer meeting of the Folketing delegation and at the national congress in September.

Before his departure Glistrup asserted in an interview in JYLLANDS-POSTEN that the talk in the press of internal criticism of him in the party was an "outright lie," and that he did not know of any such criticism. Those statements came after the Progress Party secretariat had received numerous telephone calls from local Progress Party people and party members who took exception in strong terms to Mogens Glistrup's recent political course. All over the country the local people report strong reactions on the part of party activists and demands that Glistrup change his style if he wants to stay as leader of the Progress Party.

Rufus Group

One particular set, called "the Rufus group," sent a request to Mogens Glistrup a month ago for support for starting a new party, so that the existing Progress Party delegation in the Folketing can be purged and a more steadfast party line laid down according to Glistrup's own wishes. The request from the Rufus group was sent to all members of the Folketing delegation. It is believed, however, that so far only Mogens Glistrup, Mogens Voigt, and Uwe Jensen have thanked the group for the idea and reserved it for positive consideration.

If the formation of a new party should become a reality, it is still very hard to say how many of the members of the Folketing delegation will wish to support Glistrup in the end. Besides the two named above, the fraction of the Folketing delegation that usually support Glistrup includes Kai Nyborg, Leif Glensgård, Børge Halvgaard, Helge Dohrmann, and Finnur Erlendsson. At times Kirsten Jacobsen can be put in that group. Several of these, however, have sometimes taken exception to Glistrup's contributions to the rightist newspaper DANSKE TIDENDE and to his position on the so-called Junior case. Thus Glistrup will not be able to count on support from all of his "stalwarts" in the Folketing delegation.

Potato Group

The members of the Folketing delegation that are thinking these days of a showdown with Mogens Glistrup are divided into three smaller groups, but attempts are under way to get them together in a joint action at the party congress and the meeting of the delegation. There is talk of a group of so-called "realists," which includes the new candidates for the position of national chairman Anker Tang Sørensen, Uffe Thron Dahl, Ole Maisted, Steffen Kjærulff-Schmidt, Ole Pilgaard Andersen, and Bent Wissing. Jørgen Junior can also be counted in this group. Another group is centered around John D. Lawaetz and goes by the name of "the potato group." The name comes in part from the fact that one member of the group is the potato grower Ernst B. Schmidt, of Lyhne. Other members are Børge Møller and H.C. Hansen. There are constant contacts between the two groups, and attempts are being made to draw in the more independent members, who have not yet taken a clear position with regard to the internal conflict. These include first and foremost Ove Jensen, the chairman of the delegation, and John Arentoft, Knud Nauwerby, Erling Askjær Jørgensen, and Kristen Poulsen.

Reactions

In the local chapters of the Progress Party there is no longer a willingness to overlook the party leader's connection with the DANSKE TIDENDE, and even if Mogens Glistrup promises to bow to a resolution of the party congress forbidding any connection with the paper, it is possible that he cannot hold his position very long.

"I am quite sure that most members of the Progress Party regard the DANSKE TIDENDE and its editor Erik Haaest as party enemy no. 1," says the chairman

of the party chapter in Brønderslev, Anders G. Andersen, a real estate agent. He promises that at the party congress the members from North Jutland will demand that the connection with the DANSKE TIDENDE be broken off.

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NIELSEN MOVE SEEN AS POSSIBLE THREAT TO JØRGENSEN GOVERNMENT

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 7-8 Jul 79 pp 1, 16

[Article by Erik Meier Carlsen: "LO Chairman Puts Ticking Bomb Under SV Government"]

[Text] Calls for joint meeting between the LO [Danish Federation of Trade Unions] and the Social Democratic Party Folketing delegation during the government negotiations in September

Thomas Nielsen, chairman of the LO, has put a ticking bomb under the collaboration between the Social Democratic Party and the Liberal Party.

Thomas Nielsen has called for a joint meeting between the Social Democratic Folketing delegation and the LO executive committee on 17 September.

That is 14 days before the time the government has set for filling in the outlined retrenchment program that was included in the compromise in June, and 14 days before Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen is to state in the opening address the government's plans for the coming Folketing year. The time, in other words, was chosen to come precisely when the internal government discussions can be expected to be at their hottest.

Thomas Nielsen tells INFORMATION that it is the first time in several years for a meeting of that kind to be held, but that he expects that at that time there "will be a situation that will make it necessary to exchange views" in that forum.

Poul Dalsager, chairman of the Social Democratic Party's Folketing delegation, confirms to INFORMATION that the invitation has been accepted and the date set for the meeting. He also says that "we have not gotten so far" as to agree on what shall be discussed.

INFORMATION asked Thomas Nielsen whether it was the retrenchment discussions that he wanted to talk about.

"Yes, the retrenchment discussions and the speech from the throne."

"Does that mean that you are worried about the course these discussions may take?"

"Yes, I am worried, as one may well be in view of what has happened up to now. And in view of the notions that the Liberals have about retrenchments."

I Have to Depend on It

"On the other hand, I understood from your public statements that you have got firm guarantees from the prime minister that there will be no cutbacks, such as the Liberals want, in social services or in the cost-of-living increases?"

"Yes, that is what was said to me. I have to depend on it."

Thomas Nielsen also said that he is still counting on it that the close contact committee meetings between the top echelon of the party and the ministers and the top echelon of the trade union movement will be continued. But no meeting has been agreed upon for the moment.

No Confidence

But by his big meeting between the Folketing delegation and the LO executive committee, Thomas Nielsen has tried to ensure himself against the situation that made it possible for Anker Jørgensen to form the SV [Social Democratic/Liberal] government a year ago.

Several have stressed the fact that the Folketing delegation got no clear orientation at that time about the attitude in the LO executive committee.

From Thomas Nielsen's statements to INFORMATION today it is clear by implication that he feels no confidence in Anker Jørgensen's assurances that the Social Democratic Party will not allow encroachments on social services and cost-of-living adjustment.

Liberals' Demand

Retrenchment in the cost-of-living increases was a Liberal demand even at the time of the collaboration agreement.

Since the government intervention was included in the agreements, it was emphasized by the prime minister and the Liberal ministers that the intervention rested on the condition that during the 2 years covered by the agreements there would be three cost-of-living adjustments.

Today there is every indication that there will be four and possibly five.

Nor are Liberal politicians missing any opportunities to demand cutbacks in the cost-of-living adjustment this fall.

In addition, the Liberal Party is demanding social service savings and cutbacks in the per diem system.

Tuesday Folketing member Svend Hovmand told KRISTELIGT DAGBLAD that all fields must be included in the discussion of filling in the retrenchment outline.

"Unemployment benefits and sick pay are the items that are most conspicuous in the state social welfare budget. And it is clear that we must make an effort here, primarily to get rid of abuses. But we must also take a look at aid to children in the form of day care, nurseries, and kindergartens, without on that account being accused of being asocial," said Hovmand.

The Liberals have found new occasion for demanding changes in the per diem system since the publication of the report of the agricultural labor market committee, which was discussed in INFORMATION yesterday. Hans Jørgen Holm, the Liberals' spokesman on labor market policy, tells INFORMATION that he wants the base for the 26-week rule changed from the 3 years in effect since 1 January to 1.5 years.

After 1.5 years the unemployed will have an offer of a job from the public special employment program.

Hans Jørgen Holm cannot say anything about how much money that will save.

"But we have seen under the employment program already carried out that about half said no, thanks and thus took themselves out of the per diem system. I think the most important thing is to get them sorted out from those who are really available for the labor market.

Of Hans Jørgen Holm's statements, Thomas Nielsen says, "The bourgeois never miss any opportunity to attack support of the unemployed."

He flatly rejects Holm's proposal. "Certainly abuses occur. The employers do take advantage of putting people on unemployment relief, so that they are unemployed for the time being but reemployed when needed. These are things that we could sit down and talk about in peace and quiet, but not with the proposal that is being presented now," says Thomas Nielsen.

The retrenchment discussions, however, are not the first occasion for confrontation in the SV government.

According to the government's schedule, in August the distribution of the 1.5 billion kroner allotted for employment-promoting measures in the June compromise is to be worked out.

ELECTRICITY NEED, SUPPLY FOR 1990 PREDICTED

West Berlin DIW WOCHENBERICHT in German Vol 46, 14 Jun 79 pp 253-260

[Excerpts] The forecasts of power consumption for 1985 and 1990 given below, including an outlook for the year 2000 and a study of approaches for providing the required power-generating capacity, are the results of an appraisal on which the DIW [German Institute for Economic Research] is working under contract to an enterprise of the energy industry.¹ The forecast differs from that prepared in 1977 on the basis of the year 1975 insofar as power consumption for 1990 is estimated to be 13 percent lower than expected at that time.² This is essentially due to the fact that in departing from earlier standards, the basis is a forecast of the total economic development which is segregated by sectors and assumes for the period from 1977 to 1990 an average annual growth in the real gross national product of only 2.5 to 3.2 percent.

Corresponding to the differing assumptions in regard to the further growth of the economy, the results of the power consumption forecast also differ between a base case and a variant. Based on the summary of the individual results of sector estimates and considering the various assumptions made, the annual increase in net power consumption for the FRG is expected to be as follows.

For the base case: an average of 3.6 percent from 1977 to 1985 and an average of 3.2 percent from 1985 to 1990; for the variant: an average of 4.2 percent from 1977 to 1985, and an average of 3.6 percent from 1985 to 1990. The new power consumption will then be between 455 and 475 GkWh in 1985 and between 530 and 570 GkWh in 1990.

For the outlook to the year 2000 and based on the assumptions for the overall economic and demographic developments (and based on an assumed average growth in real gross national product of 2 to 2.5 percent per annum), an annual growth in power consumption of between 2.3 percent and 2.8 percent is estimated for the 1990's. In the year 2000, the net power consumption in the FRG will then be between 760 GkWh and 750 GkWh.

Development of the Demand for Generating Capacity

Assuming an average annual utilization period of the bottleneck generating capacity to be 4,800 to 4,900 hours per annum, and for the above-estimated power consumption for 1990, a generating demand for 109,000 MW results for the base case, with 116,400 MW for the variant.

This means that, in view of an effective generating capacity of 83,700 MW installed at the end of 1977, additional powerplant generating capacity of 25,300 MW for the base case and 32,700 MW for the variant is required. Considering the probable age-related decommissioning of hard coal powerplants (after 30 years of operation by 1990, a total of about 11,000 MW), the requirement to increase net generating capacity by 1990 expands to 36,500 MW for the base case and 43,900 MW for the variant.

An additional capacity of 16,400 MW is currently under construction. Thus, an additional deficit in generating capacity of about 20,000 MW to 28,000 MW remains to be met for the period of the forecast.

Thus, if no powerplants are built other than those now under construction, projected demand will outstrip available generating capacity for the base case by 1985. For the variant, this situation occurs 2 years sooner. The specific generating deficits to be met can be seen in Table 5. We can only draw attention to the uncertainty of interpolating the generating demand between the test years 1977 and 1985, and between 1985 and 1990, respectively; for example, the dependence of demand on the economic situation.

A certain temporal displacement of the deficit in generating capacity through postponement of decommissioning is possible; maneuvering room for this is available, however, only until 1986-1987, but not for the following years, during which the gulf between available and required capacity widens rapidly.

The problem of meeting the generating demands in the future becomes clearer if one looks beyond 1990. Even for the relatively slow growth in power consumption, assumed to be between 2.3 percent and 2.8 percent average per year for 1990-2000, a requirement for generating capacity on the order of from 136,000 to 150,000 MW results for the year 2000. Compared to the projected requirement for capacity in 1990, there arises a demand for additional powerplant capacity to be added during the last decade of this century of between 27,000 MW and 34,000 MW. In this connection, no allowance has been made for the expected decommissioning of power plants during this period.⁵

On Meeting the Demand for Generating Capacity

Due to the long maturation and conversion times, there can be no significant applications of new technologies for power generation within the forecast period until 1990. The contribution to meeting demand in power generation

through expanded industrial heat-power cogeneration is often neglected, as it will be in the remainder of these considerations.⁶

Obstacles that are partly natural and economic and partly due to energy policies lie in the path of increasing the capacity of hydro, soft-coal, heating-oil, and natural-gas powerplants. Thus, in essence, only hard-coal and nuclear powerplants are being considered for meeting the future capacity demands until 1990.

Based on a primarily cost-oriented consideration, according to which powerplants operating on river water, soft coal, and nuclear energy will principally provide base generating capacity (whose estimated share of total capacity is about 50 percent), with the other types of powerplants meeting mid and peak demand, there is even now a clear mismatch between installed and required capacity. According to the above definition, there is now a shortfall in capacity to meet base demand, and the shortfall will increase in the future; in the midcapacity range, in contrast, there is overcapacity, which will decrease only in the midfuture.

To assure the supply of power during the 1980's, it is most important to close the threatening gap in capacity; only secondary importance can be assigned to the above-defined capacity spectrum consideration: The provision of power also demands that midload powerplants should be used in the base-load range. To what extent this will be necessary depends greatly on the construction of new nuclear powerplants. The total capacity of nuclear powerplants currently in operation or under construction is about 18,600 MW. The safety, environment, and sociopolitical problems discussed in connection with the commercial utilization of nuclear energy, as well as the decisions yet to be made on the feasibility of implementing the waste disposal concepts proposed by the federal government may prevent expanding the nuclear powerplant capacity beyond the 18,600 MW until the disputed questions have been clarified.

But even with questions raised in connection with the operation of nuclear powerplants answered and the further construction of such facilities held to be politically justifiable and feasible, additional nuclear powerplant capacity would not be available until the second half of the 1980's, due to the long time required for planning, permits, and construction.

Even though hard-coal and nuclear powerplants, in view of the current cost situation, are not interchangeable in their application--nuclear energy in the base capacity and hard coal in the midcapacity--the capacity of hard-coal powerplants to be constructed in the future is, for all practical purposes, dependent on the development of nuclear powerplant capacity.⁷ Against the background of the above considerations on the future construction of nuclear powerplants, it is unavoidable that the capacity of hard-coal powerplants be expanded into the second half of the 1980's in order to assure the supply of power.

The capacity of additional hard-coal powerplants to be constructed until 1990 is described by two scenarios that have been modeled.⁸

Scenario 1

In scenario 1, it is assumed that the capacity of nuclear powerplants until 1990 does not exceed a level of 18,600 MW, that is, that until then, only those nuclear powerplants will be working that are operating now or are now under construction. In order to meet fully the demand through the end of 1990, it is necessary, in using this assumption, to increase the capacity of hard-coal powerplants to a total of 41,000 MW for the base case and to 48,000 MW for the variant.

Starting with the total capacity of 29,000 MW of hard-coal powerplants (including mixed fuels) existing at the end of 1977, considering decommissioning (11,000 MW by 1990), and including the total capacity of about 3,000 MW of hard-coal powerplants currently under construction, it will be necessary to construct additional hard-coal powerplants with a total capacity of 3,500 MW or 23,000 MW for the base case, and 8,000 MW or 30,000 MW for the variant by 1985 or 1990, respectively.

In this scenario, the expanded application of hard-coal powerplants in the base generating regime leads to a consequent significant expansion of hard-coal consumption and thus of hard-coal quantities required.

For the base case, the consumption of hard coal is computed at 34 million tons coal equivalent for 1985 and 57 million tons coal equivalent for 1990. For the variant, it is about 38 million tons coal equivalent for 1985 and 65 million tons coal equivalent for 1990.

Implementation of scenario 1 decidedly depends on having timely and appropriate construction decisions made regarding hard-coal powerplants so that the availability of the required hard coal is assured.

Scenario 2

Scenario 2 is based on the assumption that nuclear powerplant capacity (beyond the 18,600 MW in operation or under construction now) to meet increases in base demand will, due to the length of time now required for permits and construction, become available only after 1986. The gap that will exist until then in base generating capacity will temporarily be closed by hard-coal powerplants, which, once nuclear powerplants go into operation, will be successively transferred to the midcapacity regime.

The nuclear powerplant capacity in the FRG would, in this case, have to be expanded to between 32,000 MW and 36,000 MW by 1990.

The required capacity of hard-coal powerplants would reach a temporary maximum point of between 29,000 MW to 34,000 MW in 1986 for scenario 2. A

capacity of only between 27,000 MW and 31,000 MW would be required in 1990. Considering powerplants to be decommissioned and those that are now under construction, the total extent of hard-coal powerplant capacity to be added for the entire forecast period (1977-1990) is 9,300 MW for the base case and 13,000 MW for the variant.

For such a development, the required quantity of hard coal is significantly reduced. This is even more pronounced because hard-coal powerplants will be used primarily in the midcapacity regime under conditions of scenario 2. For 1990, the consumption of hard coal is estimated to be only 31 to 34 million tons coal equivalent, with 36 to 41 million tons coal equivalent to be consumed in 1986.

If the assumptions made for the two scenarios are also made for the 1990's, then for scenario 1, which presumed no expansion of nuclear powerplant capacity, we get a required hard-coal powerplant capacity of 73,000 MW for the base case and 88,000 MW for the variant in the year 2000. In this case, it will be necessary to use between 115 and 135 million tons coal equivalent of hard coal for power generation. In scenario 2, in which further nuclear powerplant expansion for meeting the base demand is assumed, the capacity of hard-coal powerplants would have to be increased to 42,000 MW for the base case and 49,000 MW for the variant by the year 2000. The hard-coal consumption for this development would be between 55 and 65 million tons coal equivalent in the year 2000. With the assumptions of scenario 2, there would also be a simultaneous expansion of nuclear powerplant capacity to between 50,000 MW and 58,000 MW by the year 2000.

Conclusions

Both scenarios are basically achievable through 1990, both from the point of view of feasibility of expanding the construction of hard-coal powerplants and from the point of view of the availability of hard coal. If one looks to the year 2000, however, then substantial doubts exist as to whether the development described in scenario 1 can be achieved. It is for this reason that putting additional nuclear powerplants into operation in the FRG is to be considered for the 1990's.

The concerned enterprises believe that it is possible to put hard-coal powerplants with a total capacity of about 10,000 MW into operation by 1985--above the nearly 3,000 MW already under construction. For the follow-on period, an additional capacity of about 23,000 MW should be designed so that, altogether, a hard-coal powerplant capacity of nearly 33,000 MW should be planned on. However, such planning also contains options that are viewed as alternatives by the enterprises. A return to such options may be necessary if an appropriate construction of additional nuclear powerplants becomes impossible. From the point of view of capacity, scenario 1 could be implemented through 1990.

In view of the domestic mining capacity, neither of the two scenarios will present any bottlenecks, at least not until 1985, in terms of hard coal

availability. If it is assumed that corresponding contractual agreements can be made, the German hard-coal-mining industry believes that, starting with 1982-1983, 45 million tons of hard coal can be delivered annually to the electrical power industry.¹⁰ Below, we assume a domestic availability of maximum 50 million tons for 1990.

Under these assumptions, the quantities of hard coal required under scenario 2 can be provided from domestic hard-coal mining, while under the assumptions of scenario 1, hard-coal imports on the order of 7 million tons coal equivalent for the base case and 15 million tons coal equivalent for the variant will be required in 1990. Such an increase in hard-coal imports, however, presumes a change in the current import-quota system.

A lifting or, if applicable, stepwise lifting of this regulation would not harm the German hard-coal mining industry, because the amount of domestic hard coal to be used for the generation of electricity is assumed to be a maximum of 45 to 50 million tons coal equivalent in scenario 1. A lifting would even be useful, because that would create early opportunities to conclude long-term delivery contracts and thus expand the range of goods offered in the area of primary energy sources.

If the energy policy goals formulated in the second update of the federal government's energy program are followed, according to which the "priority use of domestic hard coal for energy supply determines the scale for the policy of the federal government in the sphere of energy conversion," and the construction of additional nuclear powerplants is considered justifiable only within the limited scale created by the primary utilization of other approaches, then scenario 1, described above, can be given priority from an energy policy viewpoint.¹¹ However, the effects on cost and price developments and the load on the environment connected with an increased use of hard-coal powerplants must be considered. Inasmuch as increased use of hard-coal energy generation could substantially raise the price of power, influences to slow down the future development of energy consumption are not to be excluded.

These considerations should also include the environmental impact that comes from decommissioning of overage facilities that do not meet today's environmental standards, as well as from the installation of smoke and gas desulfurizing facilities of new powerplants.

In assessing the cost evaluation, we should consider that at least until the second half of the 1980's there is essentially no choice in respect to what types of powerplants are to be put into operation. For this reason, the costs of power generation by coal-fired powerplants, which from today's perspective look higher, have to be compared to the national economic losses (forfeiting of production) that could result from potential generating capacity bottlenecks.

Because, in both scenarios, the expansion of powerplant generating capacity needed into the second half of the 1980's can only be accomplished through

hard-coal powerplants, capacity bottlenecks can only be avoided if the appropriate construction decisions are made quickly and the construction of new hard-coal powerplants is begun immediately. In order to meet the capacity requirements until and including 1986, additional hard-coal powerplants with a capacity of between 3,000 MW (for the base case) and 8,000 MW (for the variant) must be put into operation above and beyond the 3,000 MW already under construction.

A decisive precondition for the increasing contribution of German hard coal to electrical generation, which for the period after 1990 will be required even under the conditions of scenario 2, is a binding decision of the government decision-makers about the long-term energy policy strategy. Only against a background of an assured market potential in the electrical industry will the German hard-coal-mining industry make the investment decisions necessary to maintain and, above all, to expand current mining capacities.

FOOTNOTES

1. The appraisal is to be published as a DIW special issue in the fall of 1979.
2. The German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin, the Energy Industry Institute of the university at Cologne, the Rhine-Westphalia Institute for Economic Research, Essen: "The Future Development of Energy Demand in the Federal Republic of Germany and Means for Meeting It, the Outlook Until the Year 2000." Essen, 1978.
5. As a rough estimate, one can assume that in the year 2000 all powerplants (other than hydro powerplants) that were operating in 1970 will be decommissioned. That means that for the 1990's, a decommissioning of about 35,000 MW will occur. Here the decommissioning of about 11,000 MW by 1990 has been taken into consideration.
6. The data on the commercially usable potential of industrial heat-power cogeneration vary widely. Thus, for example, the Industrial Power Industry Association estimates that the potential is about 8,000 to 9,000 MW, while the Association of German Powerplants estimates it as only 4,000 to 5,000 MW. In either case, considerable investment would be necessary.
7. On the cost differences for power generation between hard-coal and nuclear powerplants, see D. Schmitt, H. Junke, K.-F. Ebersbach, and H. Prechtel, "Parametric Study To Evaluate the Cost of Power Generation from Hard Coal and Nuclear Energy," in AKTUELLE FRAGEN DER ENERGIEWIRTSCHAFT, Vol. 13, Munich, 1978.
8. Both scenarios are based on the following assumptions: (1) The total generating capacity requirement forecast is divided evenly between the

base generating regime and the mid- and peak-demand generating regime; (2) River-water, soft-coal, and nuclear powerplants are used entirely for base generation, as are hard-coal powerplants with about 2,000 MW capacity; natural-gas powerplants with a capacity of about 8,000 MW will be used in the base capacity until 1985 inclusive. Until 1990, the use of natural-gas powerplants for the base generating capacity will decrease by about 1,000 MW per year down to a value of 3,000 MW; (3) The rate of decommissioning of hard-coal powerplants is computed on the assumption of a 30-year operating life time; (4) A capacity expansion in connection with an industrial heat-power cogeneration is not to take place.

9. Thus, by the end of the 1980's, the use of hard coal in the power-generating industry could even go below the volume that will be mined at the end of the existing 10-year contract (which expires in 1987). A higher hard-coal consumption could be possible under the assumptions of scenario 2 if there is a displacement of an equivalent amount of natural gas and heating oil used in powerplants.
10. See the protocol of the 18th session of the committee for economy of the German parliament held on 19 Oct 77, in OEFFENTLICHE ANHOERUNG VON SACHVERSTAENDIGEN ZUR ENERGIEPOLITIK (Public Hearing of Experts on Energy Policy), Series 18/50.
11. Second Update of the Energy Programs Dated 14 Dec 77, B. T.-printed matter, 8/1357, Tz. 27.

6948

CSO: 3103

MAJOR TEST STILL AHEAD FOR KOIVISTO COALITION

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 28 Jun 79 p 4

[Commentary by Henrik von Bonsdorff: "Political Summer Calm"]

[Text] In the government a moderately satisfactory and peaceful mood prevails, at least for the summer. This is Premier Koivisto's characterization of the situation now that the ministers are ready to follow in the tracks of the Riksdag to summer work. This indicates that the irritation in the coalition following the failure of the night school of last week has abated, at least to some degree. The predictions of a crash landing for Koivisto have at least been proven false. And that is something. It gives him and his colleagues the chance to try again in the fall. Later, we shall have to see.

This modest improvement in the climate is the result of the ministers', after midsummer, having taken the opportunity they afforded themselves of deciding at least one question before they adjourned for the summer. That this question was that of forestry taxation was only natural because if it were to have its full effect upon the tug-of-war over timber prices it would have to be decided before the end of the month.

Thus the parties finally succeeded in agreeing on which of the various matters which flourished in the last phase of the government negotiations will serve as guides in the future. This was something of an achievement--quite a bit of prestige had entered the question, despite the fact that differences in opinion on money did not mean very much. But Koivisto did not have many options. In the absence of a solution acceptable to the Center Party it would--as the party's main organ stressed yesterday in a leading article--in all probability mean that the Center Party would withdraw from the government. And that would have been too annoying an end to "Manus Two" [as published].

This reverse, or rather KEPU [Center Party] victory, may nevertheless not have been too difficult for the premier to swallow. As early as during the coming into existence of the government he showed willingness to accommodation on this point. And in the field the Social Democrats can still say that the last word has perhaps still not been said in the matter of the forestry tax, for they made reservations as concerns details of the special tax in view of what could happen in the party's Riksdag group when the law is dealt with this fall. KEPU, by the way, countered with similar reservations on another point in the negotiations.

This is a new, rather strange feature, of the coalition government's pattern of cooperation. The ministers agree on certain solutions, but at the same time indicate that they may abandon the line agreed upon if they meet resistance in the Riksdag groups. On central questions it is usual when decisions have been made to demand some kind of discipline on the government front, otherwise the whole thing easily becomes a loose-jointed tottering hither and yon. That the Communists were permitted to combat the industrial value added tax was bad enough. If the intention was to keep the present cabinet alive for a while longer, the premier will have to see to it that the reservations remain what they seem intended for -- as ostentatious scraps for internal party use.

That Koivisto also found himself forced to retreat in the question of revaluation must from his point of view seem a more annoying setback, for he had joined the trade union movement and the leftwing parties in their ever more heated demands for an increase in the value of the mark. Thereby he also staked his economic authority upon this measure although he himself had asserted that from the start it had become a political liability because of the initiators and though he must have been fully aware that he would have a united bourgeoisie against him in the council.

It is also a question why Koivisto tied himself so closely to so uncertain a matter. That a revaluation could possibly have had a beneficial effect during the crazy years in the middle 1970's does not necessarily mean that it alone will save the day in the present situation. In addition, the premier has himself claimed that a moderate upward revaluation of the mark would have only a marginal effect upon price developments. And if the decision on the forestry tax reform now facilitates an agreement on a moderate increase in timber prices, the most feared inflationary factor in this no longer causes great concern. Koivisto nevertheless insisted upon a line that made him a minority in his own government. This is not a very good thing for a prime minister and his authority. That impression was not improved when the FFC [expansion unknown] the day before the decision was made threatened to cause difficulties during next winter on income policy unless it got its way. To be sure, Koivisto declared that he does not wish to drag the question of revaluation of the mark into that of income policy. By his conduct, however, he has, unintentionally perhaps, made this more likely. This might not have happened had he preserved his freedom of action.

The dispute about revaluation plainly reveals the difficulties cooperation in the present government will encounter. Mauno Koivisto's starting position is clearly more difficult than that of his predecessor Sorsa in that his finance minister often takes a line on a collision course with that of the premier. Nor has KEPU a Virolainen in the cabinet. And the party's representatives for many obvious reasons feel called upon to assert their interests and points of view with all the force and consistency at their disposal.

KANSAN UUTISET, the SKP organ, is therefore right when it writes that Koivisto clearly starts under more favorable economic conditions than did his predecessors, while at the same time he finds himself in a noticeably more difficult party policy situation. Negotiation skill and sensitive political adroitness will be needed if the ship of government is to be kept to a reasonably firm course when it is forced to cruise among the reefs in the storms to be expected this fall. Johannes Virolainen said in his midsummer column in SUOMENMAA that the fall of this government would be a "great national misfortune," which must be avoided by any means. The populace probably does not share this opinion. But if Koivisto II is to endure its presupposes that the premier and his cabinet, as well as the politicians of the supporting parties use the summer respite for reflection and a thorough self-examination.

11256

CSO: 3109

'RIZOSPASTIS' DERIDES KARAMANLIS' APPRAISALS

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 26 Jul 79 pp 1,9 AT

[Editorial: "Who Will Pay for Damages?"]

[Text] During the other day's presidential palace reception Prime Minister Karamanlis forecast "increased difficulties" in our country's future. He referred to the "deteriorating international situation" as the reason for this, obviously meaning the energy crisis raging within capitalist economy which, at the same time, worsened all aspects of the perpetual general crisis of the modern "free world."

The prime minister's prognosis does not surprise anyone and, naturally, adds nothing new to the numerous similar appraisals undertaken to date--and not only from the government's side, specifically for Greece, which is nearly absolutely dependent on the multinational oil companies in the energy sector. The new recent energy crisis suddenly brought to the surface all the organizational weaknesses of its economy together with all their well-known repercussions. The specter of unemployment and the freezing of the people's living standard to new and lower levels, now appears side by side with inflation--which can now be counted in two-digit figures--with stagnation or even the drop in certain investment sectors and the increasing foreign debt.

It is, however, entirely disorienting and erroneous to attribute the reasons for these sinister appraisals exclusively upon "the international situation." Even if one accepts Karamanlis' line of thinking as correct, one could easily ask: Since all the problems come from the "outside," particularly from the multifaceted deterioration of the economic situation in the capitalist world, channeled through the well-known complex of obligations and dependence on the multinational companies and international imperialism, then why does the government insist upon its "open door" policy and its immovable attachment to the West?

Naturally, Karamanlis provided absolutely no answer to this simple question. On the contrary, he, once again, resorted to the beloved demagogic

method of maintaining that "the best that could be done, was done" by the government during the past 5 years. If, however, "the best" was done under adverse conditions, how can one explain this "sudden" appearance of so many impasses in the country's course which the prime minister was, in part, forced to admit? His logic, that "all"--with the exception of those who officially direct the country's fate--must be responsible for the current and future progress of the country, cannot be described in any other way than as a typical example of demagoguery.

One can easily discern the spasmodic attempt to conceal the real reasons for Greece's misfortune lurking behind the contradictions and the self-preening which is characteristic of his declarations. In reality the prime minister wore out his anniversary statement with an apologetic defense of the bankrupt government policy and its bitter fruit. The essence, however, is not to be found in what he said about the "past" of the 5-year period, but in his prognosis about the future. He spoke of "increased difficulties" which, generally, nobody can dispute. Who will be called upon to shoulder their heavy consequences? Who will, once again, pay for the "damages"? Will it be the industrialists and the monopolies? Naturally they will not. Karamanlis had a ready answer: "The future," he said, "will depend upon our people's behavior." Forever the ruling class and its representatives "remember" the people when new burdens and sacrifices are in sight. At such times our people suddenly become "responsible" for the country's future, for this or the other course of the country. Then comes the moment for "great" obligations... At such times, the oligarchy takes care to rid itself of every responsibility but it always remains ready to enjoy the benefits of the "wise" behavior of the workers. Karamanlis was not original in revealing the parasitic nature of the circles he represents and their rapacious intentions, even during these difficult times. He is greatly mistaken, however, if he believes that his exhortations of the "virtues" and "capabilities" of the people can deceive anyone. His attempt to place the government's entire responsibility for the country's impasse upon the already burdened shoulders of the people is condemned to failure.

The one-sided austerity also has its limits. The workers have no delusions, particularly at a time when their belt has been tightened to the utmost limit.

CSO: 4908

OVERTHROW OF KARAMANLIS CALLED FOR

Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 26 Jul 79 p 1 AT

[Editorial: "ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS' 14th Year" which appears under a top of the page-boxed head: "So Long as Karamanlis Remains in Authority the Country Will Continue To Deteriorate"]

[Text] Today, ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS enters the 14th year of its publication. It was first published on 26 July 1966. Throughout these years it never ceased to fight for its ideas, with full independence of opinion and with political integrity. Possibly the only Greek newspaper with such virtues, ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS has always defined its policy toward the people's and the country's problems under the dictates of its own conscience.

Public opinion well knows the number and form of pressures ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS was and continues to be subjected to during the past 5 years. The newspaper has managed the task of not bending. It remained firm. It did not give in and it did not capitulate. It draws the strength of its resistance from the deep conviction that it has a mission which, under certain conditions, takes on a national character. It is for this reason that the bastion stands and fights.

We are on the eve of a new struggle. It is imminent; our internal developments are possibly going through a decisive phase. Change is speedily ripening. Now, the presence of ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in the field of battle becomes more necessary than at any other time. The objective prerequisites for the salvific change exist and they are even extremely developed. If, however, there is no objective exploitation, the situation will remain as it is, it will become more complicated and it will deteriorate.

ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS will play the role dictated to it by the historic moment. It will not hesitate and it will not shake. All of us will have to make sacrifices of personal feelings and personal preferences if the great purpose is to be achieved. Every nationalist must face the new situation with a high sense of responsibility and without losing sight of the basic goal of our struggle: termination at the soonest possible time of the Karamanlis regime through popular suffrage. Under this criterion ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS will lay down the strategy and tactics for the new struggle.

FAILURE OF LEFTIST PARTIES TO UNITE EXAMINED

Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 20 May 79 p 6

[Article by Kostas Angelopoulos]

[Text] Some 5 years after the change in government, and following four electoral battles--two general and two municipal--the parties of the parliamentary Left are at present continuing to examine the possibilities of a cooperative action.

This past week, however, this question returned to political prominence by way of events which had a negatively determining effect on the prospects for this cooperation for the immediate future: At Ymittos, in the course of a public event, incidents were seen which led to a number of very sharp quarrels among the parties of the Left, creating new "wounds" and leaving new questions in the political sector of the progressive forces. Furthermore, because of the tension which has been noted recently in the relations between PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement] and the KKE (a tension which is starting to take on a chronic nature), the leaders of these two parties met at Kastrion towards the beginning of the week for a discussion, but it seems that this did not end in anything encouraging for the cause of the better development of their relations.

In the text which follows, a summary of the situation with respect to the relations among the parties of the Left is undertaken, focusing on the way that they are developing today, 7 months after their latest attempt at cooperation in the last municipal elections.

The incidents which took place last Sunday at Ymittos during the "Castro" celebration and everything which ensued in connection with these incidents in the days following came to typify the unfortunate course of relations among the parties of the Left, which--especially since May Day--have been going from bad to worse. A whole series of events have come together to show today that those opportunities for cooperation which have been offered in recent years to the parties of the Left have by and large passed by essentially unexploited by the parties concerned. The prospects for any effective form of cooperation in this sector are continually contracting,

and at the same time the credibility of the constant assertions of the various factions concerning "democratic cooperation on an equal basis," "unity of the Left," and so forth has been damaged.

For example, it is characteristic that today, 8 days before the signing of the Agreement of Accession of Greece to the European Communities, PASOK and the KKE--the two factions on the Left which are steadfastly opposed to our entry--have not elaborated a joint position on this issue even on the most minute point, either within or outside the Chamber of Deputies. (In the meeting which A. Papandreu and Kh. Florakis had, this question was not examined at all).

Characteristic as well of the unbridgeable gap which continues to exist between the KKE and the KKE-Interior was the refusal of the former to appear with its delegation at the Third Mediterranean Conference which was held in Athens a few days ago on the initiative of PASOK, on account of the presence at it of representatives of the latter.

Furthermore, in emphasis once again of the realization that there is an absence of any kind of coordination of activity among them even in the Chamber of Deputies, three parties on the Left greeted a government bill this week with each of them forming their own conception of it: In its advisory statement, PASOK accepted the principle of the bill--which regulates the composition of mixed juries--the KKE rejected it, and the EDA accepted it but expressed its reservations by using the same arguments which the KKE had employed in rejecting it.

Quite a long time before May Day--a day on which the Left was exhibited to public view in various places in Athens--the cause of cooperation and of relations more generally among the leftist parties was severely tested, on the occasion of the municipal and communal elections.

With "clenched teeth"--there was no way to escape it--PASOK, the KKE, the KKE-Interior, and the EDA cooperated in many municipalities of the country, trying to harmonize democratic dialogue on an equal basis with their specific and separate aspirations.

The results of this effort not only were not favorable to the development of their relations, but on the contrary they even created new situations which set back the cause of cooperation:

1. PASOK believes that it was "hoodwinked" in many cases by the KKE, the result being that since then there has been an increase within its ranks of distrust of the communist Left. This development especially strengthened the "centrist" element of the movement, which has been disagreeing from the beginning with notions of such a rapprochement. The significant electoral gains of the KKE in the Second District of Athens and Second District of Piraeus in the municipal elections reduced in fact the possibilities of peaceful coexistence of the two parties in

these districts. "The KKE" a PASOK deputy said to me recently, "has converted its municipal halls into 'small ministries' of the party."

"PASOK is discontented because in those areas it lost its chances to advance its hegemonistic inclinations" comes the reply from the other side.

2. The relations of the KKE with the KKE-Interior and with the EDA have further deteriorated because of the municipal elections, which in the last analysis only served to markedly accentuate once more their great conflicts. And these three parties are tasting today all the fruits of that cooperation.

3. The KKE, in order to cope with the superior strength of PASOK in the municipality of Athens, supported the "Theodorakis Plan" which ended in the creation of the "Movement For a United Left"--a development which from that point on up to the present has significantly aggravated relations among the leftist parties.

The "EAM [National Liberation Front] Generations"

The Theodorakis Movement is in disagreement today with those who maintain that "the attempt of the KKE to absorb into its ranks the forces of the traditional Left has in practice already proved to be a failure."

The same movement presents figures which, numerically considered, can persuade a person that there has been a considerable amount of activity:

Some 32 initiative committees in Athens, and preparations for another eight.

Initiative committees in Piraeus, in Salonica, in Larisa, in Volos, and in Crete.

Preparations for a pan-Athenian meeting at the beginning of June, with the next objective being the holding of an all-Greece conference for the determination of programmatic and by-law principles and for the election of central organs. Circles within this movement maintain that "quite a few thousand leftists in the capital area" will be represented at the pan-Athenian conference.

But on the other hand, the movement of the EAM generations has veritably set a match to any prospects of better relations of the KKE with the EDA, the KKE-Interior, and PASOK, in its second scheme:

The "EAM generations" insist that "many adherents of the various parties of the Left, their organized members and their prominent officers" are continually being added to their ranks, and they are making an appeal for "cooperation on an equal footing."

But of course, such cooperation becomes objectively impossible from the moment when the movement of the "EAM generations" admits in essence that it is drawing away organized members and officers from other parties, and those most exposed to such a bloodletting are reacting very sharply:

"The Theodorakis Movement is a 'joke' behind which is hiding the KKE" (speech of B. Drakopoulos in Larisa, 12 May).

"The leadership of the KKE is now trying to create a movement of the EAM-descended Left. For the sake of the success of this effort, it is using as its top gun Mikis Theodorakis" (article from the periodical NEA TIS EDA, issue of May).

As for PASOK, it will not be particularly disturbed by the characterization which Mikis Theodorakis gave it in Larisa a week ago ("a centrist party with leftist leanings"). It is more troubled by announcements of the other movement such as that which it stated a few days ago in asserting that PASOK members also participated in the movement, in the discussions for a united Left.

The Same Chasms

Besides this small confusion, all the crucial differences within the multidimensioned Left remain unresolved at the present time.

The KKE-Interior persists in refusing to call the KKE by its name (making only the concession of using in place of the "KKE-Exterior" the designation "dogmatic Communist Party"), regarding the split as at all times a given fact and preferring rivalry, despite its electoral wounds:

"...the two communist parties are separated by very deep ideological and political differences, which can be triumphed over only in the course of events and in activity and in open ideological confrontation face to face with the masses" (from an article by I AVGI, 13 May).

The EDA continues to consider PASOK and its president to be "hegemonistic," and it proclaims that the KKE "as is known, has not changed its old policy the slightest bit." The opening which it is allowing to the KKE-Interior is overshadowed by its friendly relations with the "fractionists" of the Rigas Feraios group.

For its part, the KKE now appears to be "ignoring" the presence of both the "revisionists" and the "sycophants" in the EDA, throwing the weight of its efforts not on any kind of direct rapprochement of the two parties, but on ingeniously and gradually making their differences disappear. The articles of the publications of the KKE today no longer leave any margin for misunderstanding its intentions.

PASOK, in seeing its distance from the gates of power grow less at this time, with all the omens in its favor in a coming electoral confrontation, does not seem to have any inclination toward substantive cooperation with the communist Left. A cooperation which--according to its political strategy--it not only does not need, but which would even damage its political interests. In addition, the strong competition which the movement is meeting with from the KKE in the lower-class sectors has especially aggravated the relations between the two parties.

The scene of the "peculiar" relations among the parties of the Left is completed, finally, by the firm refusal of PASOK to attend any discussion which the small extraparlimentary "Socialist March" might have had anything to do with--a group which maintains more or less friendly relations with the EDA and with the KKE-Interior. Thus, 5 years after the change in government, the problems in the sector of the Left not only remain unresolved, but are even growing. And perhaps the chief realization to emerge from the developments of recent weeks is that the leftist parties, which are still far away from any prospects of cooperation, do not even have the power to come up with as much as a formula for peaceful coexistence, leaving aside for later the more difficult tasks.

How could there exist a "common program" which the leaders of the Left have referred to and are referring to even today, when parties which propose this have to make special efforts in order that the one party can even tolerate the existence of the other?

How could the longed-for "unity among the rank and file" be achieved when the political notions of certain "leading figures" cause the formation in the ranks below of the sort of climate which led to the recent beatings of one another? ("The clash among the communists is at the level of the gutter" crowed the well-known newspaper of the extreme Right).

And who could explain satisfactorily why on the day of the celebration of the workers' May Day, the mayor of the capital was prevented from speaking at this event? He is a person who won his election as an adversary of the Right, by the votes of all the parties of the democratic opposition.

No Reactions

The cooperation of the democratic forces has returned to the limelight within a climate which is grave for the parties of the Left. The progressive community read about the proposals and the positions of the general secretary of the KKE, Kh. Florakis, last Sunday in the party's journalistic organ. There followed the meeting with A. Papandreou.

In the initial years which followed the change in government, such events roused an exceptionally lively interest among the general public of the progressive forces. Today, the statements of Mr Florakis ("...either a coalition of parties, or a parallel activity..."), the curt answer which

the leader of the KKE received from the president of PASOK ("cooperation only in the mass-movement sectors and in local self-government") did not excite anybody.

Burdened with 5 years of bitter experiences in the above matters, the subconscious of the large majority of the rank and file of the Left reinforces their realization of the impasse which exists. In the 5 years which have passed since the summer of 1974, there has been an abusing of the use of "poisoned darts" in the sector of the Left. And the basis for better relations among its parties was built completely wrong. What has remained from the week which just passed is the familiar bitter taste....

12114

CSO: 4908

'RIZOSPASTIS' WANTS UN CYPRUS RESOLUTIONS IMPLEMENTED

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 20 Jul 79 p 1 AT

[Editorial: "Five Years from the Twin Crime in Cyprus"]

[Text] The deep wound which the twin crime of the U.S. Pentagon, CIA and NATO has inflicted on Cyprus still remains open and dangerous. Five years after the junta coup and the Turkish invasion, the people who inspired and organized the barbarian aggression remain unaccountable to conspire and weave new partitionist plans for the completion of that aggression.

It would not be an exaggeration to state that in the Cyprus problem--an international problem by its nature--are reflected the basic aspects of the modern world which are diametrically opposed and historically unconciliatory.

On the Cyprus problem has been indelibly impressed the inhumanity, barbarity and brutality of the Pharisaic defenders of "human rights" who have converted the land of the megalonisos into one more arena for the implementation of the policy of violence, brutal interventions and criminal adventurism.

However, the dynamism of progressive and peace-loving humanity, the international movement for peace and social progress with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the vanguard, have been expressed with equal determination and consistency. It therefore can be "convinced" by clandestine "documents" and other suspicious concoctions that are skillfully proffered to deceive public opinion.

Of course, the exquisite methodology of distortion is a "natural" quality of imperialist propaganda and does not come as a surprise. However, what is the aim of the corresponding government eloquence which wants to consider Soviet support to Cyprus "academic" and U.S.-NATO intervention as completely "logical," "indispensable" and "necessary"?

Five years after the tragedy of July, the government of the right continues to consider the Cyprus problem solely and simply as a "headache." It has avoided and systematically refuses to open the dossier of treason, citing excuses which, to say the least, show a lack of national sensitivity and dignity. Its declared solidarity with Cyprus has degenerated in practice through the abandonment of the internationalization of the problem and its involvement in the procedures of the U.S.-NATO "intercession." Therefore, the government should not "protest" the uproar its policy is causing. The responsibilities it is shouldering are enormous and undoubtedly they are increasing with the new binding obligations it is apparently undertaking for the country's accession to the EEC.

If the government of the right has very quickly "forgotten" the physical and moral perpetrators of the Cyprus tragedy, the country's progressive forces, our people's overwhelming majority, have not forgotten the events of July and their always timely lessons. They know that the broadest and most active solidarity for the brotherly Cyprus people constitutes simultaneously a significant factor for the development of their own parallel struggle against the common enemy. The contribution of the unitary and coordinated activity of the progressive forces of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey toward this director for advancement and implementation of the UN resolutions is valuable and irreplaceable for Cyprus to be vindicated and peace and security in the area to be consolidated.

CSO: 4908

'I KATHIMERINI' WARNS AGAINST LOSS OF CYPRUS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Jul 79 p 5 AT

[Editorial: "A Matter of Existence"]

[Excerpts] Yesterday was one more anniversary. It was a black anniversary like its immediate predecessor, that is, the anniversary of the junta coup in Cyprus which was organically linked to it. Without the junta coup of 15 July 1974 there would not have been any Turkish military aggression on 20 July in Cyprus.

The criminal coup, which on the eve of its dissolution the traitorous and corrupt "regime" of the pretorians of Athens attempted against the constitutional order and the elected and legal leader of the republic of Cyprus, supplied Turkey with the pretext and the possibility it had been waiting for in order to set foot on Cyprus.

It was a pretext because the overthrow of constitutional order in Cyprus and "the need to protect the Turkish Cypriot community" which Turkey cited as the "reason" for the invasion were not the true reasons. Nothing happened to the Turkish Cypriot community. It was not in any danger. This was well known to it and Ankara. Regarding constitutional order, that was indeed restored a few days later with the abolition of the Athens "regime" and of its dirty appendix in Cyprus. Yet, Turkey not only did not withdraw its troops but even launched a second attack, occupying about 40 percent of the land of the Cyprus state and uprooting 200,000 Cypriots from their homes.

The developments which have taken place since--or rather have not taken place--and Turkey's entire behavior and position, leave no doubt of its true intentions: The consolidation of the "faits accomplis" and the possible Turkification of all of Cyprus at the "proper time" if and when conditions permit it. Even the fate of the last effort for the resumption of the "intercommunal" talks has confirmed Ankara's reluctance to seek any legitimate and generally acceptable solution.

The invader will not easily give up his "acquisitions" and his plans, especially in view of the "support" and the "favors" he has from some of the great of this world. The road that leads to the restoration of Cyprus' Hellenism will be long and difficult, and the suspenseful state of the problem augurs to be long.

However, Cyprus' Hellenism will not be left to decline. It has the right to live free and independent in its country, in a unitary and independent Cyprus. This goal will remain firm, however long it takes and whatever efforts may be required by all of us.

This year we shall repeat everything we stressed last year in connection with the interdependence of the Greek and Cypriot Hellenism and the position we should take vis-a-vis the national crisis. All of us in Cyprus and Greece should coexist with the long crisis. It is a matter of endurance and fortitude. We must not let the prolongation of the state of suspense, tiredness, "habituation" and insidious foreign influences erode us. "Lingering" in itself is erosive, and this is what we should be careful about, the unity and the unanimity of Hellenism, Greek and Cypriot, and mutual trust between these two parts is the first and most fundamental prerequisite in order to endure this long crisis.

The fate of all Hellenism is unitary and indivisible. Already we have suffered great hemorrhages. There is no room for the loss of another part of Hellenism without fatal repercussions on the rest of the race. Were Cyprus to be lost, the rift in Hellenism's perimeter would be most serious and repercussions on the Greek area which would be the next target would be direct and very dangerous and threatening.

Let us ponder all these things during this black anniversary. Let us remain vigilant, united, aware and determined. It is a matter of existence.

CSO: 4809

'I VRADYNI' ASSURES CYPRIOTS OF VINDICATION

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 20 Jul 79 p 2 AT

["Evening" column: "In Support of the Cypriots"]

[Text] Cyprus is shaking with rage, bitter memories and determination. This is the fifth anniversary of the Turkish invasion, the dirty coup of the national traitors which permitted "Attila" to set forth on Cyprus.

Five years have passed under indescribable ordeals with many hurricanes during this period--national, political and economic. There have been numerous disappointments: the inadequacy of the United Nations, our era's indescribable palate, the indifference of the great; the inability of international society to impose the principles of justice and morality.

There have been many wounds--refugees, missing persons, the issue being held in suspension--but morale has remained high and heads high. Internal unity has been solid despite political shocks. There has been a militant spirit and a self-confidence; not a moment's doubt about the future.

Hellenism has been supporting the Cypriots, the Hellenism of Greece and of all continents. The government, organizations and the people remember and renew their devotion to the Cyprus cause. They help with deeds and words.

We admire the endurance, the fortitude and the creativity of the Greek Cypriots. They have found vindication in the people's consciences. They are fighting hypocrisy, cynicism and illegal interests.

It is certain, absolutely certain, that sooner or later the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus will be restored through logic and legality.

CSO: 4908

KKE (INTERIOR) ISSUES DECLARATION ON ANNIVERSARY OF JUNTA FALL

Athens I AVGI in Greek 22 Jul 79 pp 1,8 AT

[KKE (Interior) declaration issued 22 July 1979: "Current Problems Were Created by the Solutions Implemented in 1974"]

[Text] Five years have passed since the fall of the militarist tyranny and Greece is facing great problems, the sources of which are to be found in solutions that were implemented at the time and which have put their stamp on the country's 5-year course. The junta dictatorship was not only the fruit of a conspiracy within the armed forces which had been fostered by the CIA, it was the result of the impasses within the system of capitalist exploitation in conditions of crisis and the more general shocks to the values of the bourgeois world. The junta took advantage of this and of the unrestrained competition in the democratic camp. It also took advantage of the low level of social organization of the working people. The new democratic patriotic conscience that had been shaped in the struggle against the militarist tyranny from within the daily resistance and the polytechnic had sought new Greek prospects through a policy of increasing democracy and independence in accordance with the sovereign people's will on the basis of the dissolution of the mechanisms which had produced the dictatorship and of an effective shielding of a smooth democratic course.

Because of the weaknesses of the democratic movement, it was not possible to do this. The parliamentary right was restored to power. Despite some efforts to modernize the system, it remained within the sphere of interests and concepts of the backward and predatory Greek oligarchy. The policy of one-sided austerity, of autocracy and of Atlanticism, despite all the adjustments which the new democracy leadership attempted in order not to be completely alienated from the mood of the broad masses, led to a new aggravation of all problems of the people--from the Cyprus and Aegean problems to the daily problems of life and work which still remain unresolved. This situation deteriorated because of the worsening of the crisis of capitalism and the renewed energy crisis. Thus, on our nation's agenda was written, with the greatest possible intensity, the demand for change in policy and the rise to power of a democratic alliance of social and political forces.

Since the fall of the militarist dictatorship, the KKE (Interior) has worked for the maximum possible concentration of patriotic and democratic forces, with the unity of the forces of the left as nucleus, the consolidation and expansion of democracy as the goal and with dejuntification as its target. This policy aimed at the suffocating isolation of the most aggressive forces of the monopolies in the social and political levels, the activation of the broadest possible spectrum of forces toward problems that had become ripe in the consciences of the broadest masses so that democratic solutions might be advanced, and of effective organization of trade unionism and other social groups so that mainstays could be created for the substantive intervention of the mass movement and its gradual approach to the decision-making centers. This policy, which simultaneously kept open the front against the rightist line and called for the broadest possible democratic cooperation for a new democratic majority in the chamber and for a democratic government of cooperation based on democratic forces, was stubbornly opposed, both by the new democracy government and by the other parties of the opposition. At present the working people, all our people, can see, in the light and experience of developments during these 5 years, how correct this KKE (Interior) line has been; how better would have been the positions of democracy and of the working people if this line had been adopted by the other democratic forces; how much our democratic future has been harmed by the negation of democratic cooperation, frenzied competition and hegemonism, and "revolutionary" eloquence which objectively facilitated the right in implementing its course and perpetuating its sovereignty.

As we approach critical turns in political and social developments, it is more than ever necessary to insist on strict evaluations which correspond to the correlation of forces and to the policy of the broadest unity for a different policy and a democratic government of broad cooperation.

-The U.S. imperialists and NATO are increasing their pressures for the restoration of the notorious unity of the Atlantic alliance's southeast wing and, possibly, in order to drag our country into criminal adventurism in the Middle East area. Consequently, the broadest alliance of forces should be organized so that the country may remain "finally and irrevocably" outside the NATO military structure; that we may defend the Cyprus and Aegean causes; that our country not be dragged into any criminal adventures; and that the policy of peace and cooperation with the socialist and nonaligned countries advance with the greatest activity.

--On the basis of the compromise that occurred during the change in regime and the line of assimilation, the governments of new democracy, instead of crushing pro-junta elements, did not proceed with dejuntification and democratization in the state, administration and institutions, in the dynamic mainstays of power--the armed forces and the security corps--

where the junta had been bred. The result is that this situation is operating like a lever of pressure which undermines the most elementary measure for purification and also leads, in all sectors, in directions that are contrary to the interests of the people and the country. At present, the duty of the democratic forces is to decisively intensify their struggle for dejuntification--democratization, an indispensable element to shield a democratic course and the country's democratic economic development. This struggle is necessary in view of accession to the EEC and because it constitutes a prerequisite for reforms of a democratic and structural nature.

The government is struggling to throw the weight of the crisis on the backs of the working people, increasing even more the unequal distribution of income at the people's expense. Consequently, it is necessary to broadly organize the struggle against unemployment, underemployment and the compression of workers' and farmers' incomes. The aim must be for an automatic cost of living adjustment, agricultural price supports, the undertaking of large investment initiatives by the state so the economy can recover, and restraining energy waste and overconsumption.

--The government is openly attacking trade union and democratic freedoms or undermining them in order to destroy reaction to its class policy. Consequently, the struggle for the defense of trade unionism and public freedoms, the abolition of antiworkers laws, the formulation of new institutions which will arm the working class and the farmers, all the working people in their struggle for better remuneration, for 40 hours of work and eventually 35, should be organized at the broadest base against the predatory mania of employers in defense of the standard of living and a better life.

--The crisis of the system becomes apparent in the complete anarchy and disorganization of all social services--health, communications, education, insurance. The struggle for social services, for their improvement and availability to the public must be organized at the broadest base.

The solution to the problems which are created by the crisis and the disintegration of the system lies in the democratic way out, a direction that the KKE (Interior) proposed in good time to the other democratic forces, to social organizations, to all the people. Nobody should underestimate the efforts that have been exerted by the circles of anomaly, with imperialist encouragement in order to lead the popular movement to a reactionary way out and to a new defeat. The basis for a victorious democratic policy is a rally and a joint march of broad forces, despite differences on certain points, without the erroneous setting of conditions which force into the camp of the reactionary forces social and political forces which can contribute to the victory of a different policy and the

election of a democratic majority. One of the most delicate points of this concept is the preservation of the people-armed forces unity, a true consideration for the problems of the armed forces and the struggle for their integration into the social aggregate so that they may not constitute a separate compartment of a closed caste vulnerable to militarist lectures.

In the 5 years since the junta's fall, the KKE (Interior) has addressed to the working people, to all the people, to all patriots and democrats, a message of trust in the forces of democracy. With their unity and struggle our country will victoriously confront the crisis and steadily walk the road of consolidation and expansion of democracy, or anti-monopolistic democracy and socialism without disastrous backpedalling, adventurism and internecine tragedies.

CSO: 4908

DISPUTE REPORTED BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND KODISO OVER POLICIES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 19 Jul 79 pp 1,3 AT

[Excerpt] A lively dispute between the government and KODISO [Party of Democratic Socialism] broke out after a statement by KODISO Chairman Ioannis Pasmazoglou yesterday. The speaker argued that blaming all economic difficulties on the international energy crisis is unrelated to developments and only tends to divert attention. In his statement Pasmazoglou referred to a number of figures in order to prove that this year's inflation rise to approximately 20 percent is not due to international causes--which do not burden the cost of living index by more than 10 percent as is the case in European countries--but is due to the government's policy. This charge caused severe reaction by the government which accused Pasmazoglou of irresponsibility and described the facts which he produced as inaccurate.

Answering questions at the close of his statement, Pasmazoglou forecast that the continual pressure of problems and the government's inability to solve them will develop into factors which may become the reason for a new election before the current Chamber of Deputies serves its full 4-year term. He clarified, however, that although an election--and not repeated government reshuffles which are of interest only to personalities but of no interest to the people--is the only alternative solution today, he is not asking for the government's resignation and for the conduct of an untimely election.

The Government Reply

Answering Pasmazoglou's statement a government spokesman made the following statement: "The attempt to create mistrust in the future of Greek economy by using inaccurate facts only demonstrates lack of responsibility. Indefinite, contradictory and demagogic proposals, together with the impermissible attempt to exploit the international energy crisis for party expediences only prove the degree of sobriety of the critics. The Greek people well know both the repercussions of the international crisis as well as the systematic efforts of the government, the result of which

is that the Greek economy today holds one of the best positions internationally. This is why the Greek people always prefer those who lead them with responsibility instead of those who conduct irresponsible demogogy. As for the rest, the answer to the inaccurate facts and the deliberate misinterpretations will be furnished by Greek reality itself.

What Pasmazoglou Says

In yesterday's statement to political and economic press editors the KODISO chairman attempted to analyze the country's current economic position based on the known facts and repercussions of the energy crisis. He also blamed the government "of weakening the economy and of expanding economic inequalities." At the same time he supported that an unacceptable disregard of public opinion is cultivated, a general spirit of lack of credibility is developing and that the confidence gap between those who govern and the governed is widening, a fact which, Pasmazoglou argued, discredits the government and renders it unable to implement any policy.

Pasmazoglou accused the other opposition parties of compromise for the sake of their vote-seeking policy which sheds no light on problems, creates confusion and in the end leads into an impasse.

Specifically referring to PASOK Pasmazoglou said the proposals it puts forth from time to time would, according to the experience of other states which have tried out such programs, lead to the following:

- To large scale squandering of funds resulting from implementation of a program ordered from above and far removed from the market's apparatus.

- To a dislocation of the economy because of the inability of socialized business to function without prior establishment of responsible social agencies.

- To one-party situations and to totalitarian trends either of the right or the left because these programs are opposed by the greatest proportion of the people.

CSO: 4908

KODISO REPRESENTATIVES FOR GOVERNMENTAL DEPARTMENTS REPORTED

Athens TA NEA in Greek 16 Jun 79 p 1

/Text/ I. Pesmazoglou, president of the Democratic Socialism Party /KODISO/, has designated representatives by government sectors--in essence, by ministries. Already these representatives are holding their first joint meeting with the party's executive secretary. On the basis of these sectors, on the other hand, a Survey and Planning Committee will be formed which together with the related KODISO branch organizations will have the responsibility of charting the party's policy in each sector.

In the meantime, this afternoon the Central Committee will hold its third conference to approve the party's agrarian program as prepared by the special committee of former deputies from the provinces. This program will subsequently be discussed and further improved by the KODISO organizations.

The KODISO representatives by sector are:

International Relations: G. Mylonas, former minister.

National Defense: Spyros Mourikis, vice-admiral, honorary chief of the Navy.

Justice and Public Order: Th. Manavis, former deputy.

Public Finance: Virginia Tsouderou, Athens deputy.

Social Service Youth Affairs: K. Alavanos, Athens deputy.

National Health System Planning: I. Alivizatos, physician.

General Political Affairs (voting legislation, media-press, church-state relations): N. Argyropoulos, former deputy.

Planning (zoning and economic particularly): G. Krimbas, Athens University professor.

Farm Production-New Agrarian Reforms: Th. Anagnostopoulos, former deputy.

Industry, Energy and Trade: Khristodoulos Kourouklis, KODISO secretary general.

Employment and Work Relations: Khar. Protopappas, former minister.

Public Administration and Self-Government-Reorganization, Planning and Decentralization: Th. Bekhrakis, former nomarch.

Cultural Affairs: I. Mazarakis-Ainian, former nomarch, KODISO alternate secretary general.

Public Works, City Planning, Housing: Ar. Filippidis, former deputy.

Communications: Tasos Mimis, former Athens deputy.

Merchant Marine: Tasos Khristodoulakis, chemical engineer.

Northern Greece Affairs: Sot. Kouvelas, president of the Central Macedonia Technical Chamber.

KERKYRA PASOK ATTACK ON PAPANDREOU REPORTED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 9 Jun 79 pp 1, 5

/Text/ The Kerkyra Association of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement /PASOK/ followers launched a sharp attack against the PASOK president /Papandreou/ and the methods he is using. Under the title "The PASOK Followers Demand Respect for the Rank and File," the Kerkyra newspaper ANEXARTITOI FAIAKES (Independent Faecians) published a long and revealing letter addressed to Andreas Papandreou. The letter details what transpired in the /PASOK/ nome committee, how he dissolved the old committee which was elected by the rank and file and how he appointed a new one whose first secretary is the same person who served in a similar capacity in the dissolved committee. The letter of the Kerkyra PASOK followers states:

"All of a sudden the Kerkyra Association of PASOK Followers experienced a new 21 April /the day the junta was established/. They were loaded with an appointed committee through the method of 'We decide and appoint...'" The letter adds: "We, the followers of the movement, grant to no one the right to replace us, to suspend and to appoint the leaders who will represent us in the movement and it is we, the people of the movement, who have the prerogative to appoint and dismiss them."

Warning

Addressing Papandreou himself, they give him a warning: "If Papandreou himself took this initiative to replace the committee and thereby so rudely violating his own declarations, let him be informed that he chose the wrong place for such an experiment." They further ask:

"Where, then, did Papandreou get the nerve to replace Kerkyra's followers of the movement? And since when has PASOK begun to suspend elected officers and to appoint untried ones?"

The letter further accuses Deputies Plaskovitis and Sp. Rallis because they tolerated these unacceptable actions as did also the mayor and the 10 municipal councilors who are PASOK members. This exceedingly revealing letter--a charge of what is transpiring in PASOK--concludes as follows:

"Let Papandreou know that the 'other ones' who appear as Kerkyra leaders have not served him well. They have hurt both him and the movement. Because, playing a 'leading role' within the movement for a year now, they have succeeded in bringing it to such a bad state of affairs that all of us are surprised at its plight. Let Papandreou look at the number of PASOK candidates at the last parliamentary elections. And let him find out what the number of organized PASOK people in Kerkyra is.

"He will find out that no natural expansion, no organized expansion of PASOK takes place in Kerkyra as it does in the rest of the country. The contrary is true. We often have resignations among the members. We also have expulsions and walkouts. We have no registrations of new members, and while the rank and file multiplies continually, the organized leadership has in a short time limited itself to only those members--oh, what a shame--who are appointed."

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CSO:4908

PROBLEMS CONFRONTED BY REGIONAL PLAN CITIES REPORTED

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 16 Jun 79 p 9

[Article by Vana Papadopoulou]

[Text] The provincial cities selected by the Regional Plan for socio-economic and cultural strengthening, thus ending the Athens monopoly over all facets of life, do not want to become "replicas" of today's national capital. This point was made almost unanimously by the representatives of nomes, municipalities and communities, the productive economic classes, and of other entities in a conference held in those cities during the recent fact-finding tour conducted by Deputy Minister of Public Works St. Manos.

By contrast, they advanced numerous constructive suggestions leading to the development of the outlying suburbs instead of only the center of their cities, while taking special care to protect the farmlands, the environment and in general the areas which are of particular interest for historical, terrain or other reasons in order to have their form preserved.

Housing Authority is Mobilized

It was reported that the contracts between the Housing Authority and the planning firms were signed yesterday. The agreements deal with the drafting of plans for the urban areas of Patrai-Aigion, Ioannina, Kozani-Ptolemais, Irakleion and must be completed within 6 months. At the same time, the existing plans for Larisa-Volos and Kavala are being adjusted to the new parameters to fit the new framework so that readjustments and the implementation of changes can be readily made. The planning firms will be paid from the Public Investments Fund.

In the conferences mentioned earlier, it was agreed that the nomarchs and mayors will assume the responsibility for coordinating the contacts of the planning firms with the agencies and the other entities which play an important role in the areas in question, while the planning firms are required specifically to contact the inhabitants and especially those who are knowledgeable of the area so that the plans will be based on realistic foundations, with the participation of the interested parties.

These cities have also received for the first time considerable sums for the immediate solution of urgent problems. In certain municipalities, such as Ptolemais, Ioannina, Larisa and Volos, which have faced most acutely the problem of drafting the regulations provided by the law for the street plan of their areas, the ministry assumed the financing of the plan preparation to relieve the municipalities from the technical difficulties.

Moreover, to facilitate the task of the municipalities in developing a quality of life in marginal areas, the Housing Authority provided them with plans, analyses, specifications for kindergartens, pedestrian sidewalks, common use areas, etc. It also provided them with plans for parking areas in the center of the cities since many of these cities face a parking problem downtown, especially Irakleion, Patrai, Kosani, etc.

Many Common Problems

It was generally acknowledged that the representatives of local government and other entities that participated in the conferences with Deputy Minister Manos were deeply familiar with the problems and the weaknesses of their areas. Many of these problems are common to the eight cities and can be summarized as follows, together with the solutions proposed by their residents:

- a. Sewage projects (a basic problem for these cities, most of which have no sewage networks at all), water projects and infrastructure projects in general. According to authoritative projections, the solution of these problems requires billions of drachmas.
- b. Construction of airports where they do not exist and the expansion and modernization of the existing ones to facilitate communication with the rest of the country.
- c. Development of administrative activities which have no reason to be in Athens and the transfer of greater responsibilities to local governments.
- d. University clinics.
- e. More effective railway service, especially now with the energy crisis.
- f. Extension of the city planning and road construction with special emphasis on beltways which, in order to avoid congestion, will not go through the city.

One must make a special note of the fact that, as stressed by the appropriate officials, in none of the cities was there displeasure expressed as a result of the tightening of zoning requirements. On the contrary, in many cases the city spokesmen called for tightening these requirements even further in their struggle to improve the environment and to save the existing one. This is evidence of a high level of understanding of the housing problems, something which perhaps has not been shown in Athens.

1. PATRAI-AIGION

Present combined population of the two cities: 167,000. Projected population for the year 2000 under the Regional Plan: 450,000. Patrai urgently needs the construction of a beltway so that the traffic which is considerable will not move through the center of the city unless the city is the destination. In a comparable manner, the route of the railway must be diverted from the center.

The residents of Patrai are also concerned about the rise and role of the harbor which they wish to develop into a major transportation link serving the wider region. They are against the installation of industries which pollute the environment within the city or on valuable sites. They do not face such a problem today but they wish to forestall such a possibility.

In Aigion, city spokesmen asked for an expansion of the City Plan which today covers only one-third of the present inhabited area of the city as well as the completion of the waterfront restructuring which the ministry has already started. The desire was also expressed to strengthen the Aigion-Itea interconnection and to have the ferryboats and the cargo ships make a stop at Aigion. Aigion as a city offers many residential advantages which could be utilized because of the good quality of life it offers.

With reference to Patrai, the Ministry of Public Works earmarked 40 million drachmas for rearranging and broadening streets and opening squares; 5 million for children's playgrounds; another 45 million for 1980 for street rearrangement and broadening provided the municipality will make an effort to assure another 45 million in revenue from property owners who will benefit by the street improvements provided by the relevant law. It has been verified--and this applies to most municipalities--that municipal officials in order to maintain their popularity, fail to press for the payment of taxes owed by benefited owners.

2. IOANNINA

Current population: 45,500. Projected: 150,000. Ioannina asked for developing employment opportunities in traditional handicraft industries such as weaving, silversmithing, farming and animal breeding and also in industry.

Protecting the Lake

Another serious matter of concern to the Ioannina residents is the protection of their famous lake and of other traditional elements such as the Island, Zagori, etc., but with fewer control procedures. They also want to have the farm installations removed from the city (chicken farms, swine breeding farms) which today threaten to suffocate the city.

They also raised the issue of a swift completion of the university campus which is lagging behind schedule and the establishing of hospital facilities

and university clinics and asked for the completion of the basic road network toward Thessalia and Igoumenitsa in order to improve and expand the contacts of Ioannina with the wider area. Finally, it was proposed to modernize the local airport with equipment and to accommodate larger aircraft. As is known, the airport is in a mountainous area and requires modern equipment.

The Ministry of Public Works earmarked for Ioannina 15 million drachmas for land purchases, street-widening, etc; 15 million drachmas for the same purpose but on the condition that the municipality will collect an equal amount from those citizens who derive benefits from the development.

3. KOZANI-PTOLEMAIS

Present population: 48,000. Projected: 150,000. Kozani faces serious city planning and oekistic problems due to the lack of efforts for the modernization of the city which is old.

The residents asked also for an airport to be constructed in their area which now appears cut off from the rest of the country, and for their rail connection to be through Larisa and not through Salonica as it is now.

They also expressed the desire to have the problem that may arise eventually when the lignite deposits will be exhausted around 2020 solved within the context of the industrial development (which must not adversely affect the city). Finally, they expressed their interest in the establishment of cultural centers, music schools, etc., and also an airport.

In Ptolemais they asked for assurances that the implementation of the existing City Plan will be done in accordance with scientific standards. There is also a pressing need for the immediate and speedy linking of the city by means of a highway or local train with Kozani to serve more effectively the commuting workers and the public. An added reason is that administrative services are concentrated in Kozani thus increasing the transportation needs. It would also be useful to construct an airport since the Ptolemais area is level and suitable for this purpose.

The ministry earmarked for Ptolemais 7.5 million drachmas for developing and implementing the City Plan and another 7.5 million for the same purpose provided an equal sum is collected from the nearby property owners who will benefit from it. The ministry also earmarked another 2.2 million drachmas for drawing up parts of the Plan. (For the time being no comparable sum has been earmarked for Kozani because the interested parties, although aware of the existing needs, have made no concrete proposals.)

4. LARISA-VOLOS

Present population: 184,500. Projected: 550,000. The spokesman for the local authorities and other entities in Larisa asked during the meetings that

the Zoning Plan for the city, drafted in 1974, be sanctioned by legislation once it is adjusted to current needs, and that the City Plan be expanded to include marginal areas.

With regard to the Pineios River, they expressed the unanimous view to protect it from pollution and to construct special dams to maintain a standard rate of water flow throughout the year (currently the river dries up in the summer and overflows in the winter.) They also asked for the protection of the ancient theater on the hill and for the removal of certain military installations which handicap the development of the city.

Finally, they asked for the rerouting of the national highway from the center of the city to the periphery, to have industrial zones established, to have the hospital improved, and to establish an agricultural and a medical school.

The Ministry of Public Works earmarked for Larisa: 17 million drachmas for purchasing land and broadening the Cyprus and Anthimos Gazis Streets; 10 million drachmas for the review and implementation of the City Plan; 27 million drachmas for street construction provided that the municipality will collect an equal amount from property owners benefiting from such streets.

The Volos Harbor

For Volos and specifically for the Volos municipality, the most significant issue at this time is the development of the harbor with its new ferryboat connection between Volos and Tartous (in Syria). The inhabitants have asked for a timely study of the projected demands and needs resulting from the new functions of the harbor. But a prerequisite for any development projects is that "neither the harbor nor the city should be suffocated."

Other points raised were the need to decentralize commercial and industrial activities in Volos, to establish university level schools of mechanical engineering, medicine and Pandeios School of Public Administration as well as graduate schools. The Technical Chamber offered the site for an architectural school. They also underlined the pressing need for a baltway.

Finally, the residents expressed the desire to have the Pilion protected as a traditional area in a high quality environment, and to have the small old train which was reaching Pilion resume its operations in order to restore the area's traditional and tourist character.

The municipality of Nea Ionia in Volos raised the issue of the problems resulting from the absence of infrastructure works in their town and the need for protecting the environment. They added that the town bears some of the cost for the harbor although it does not derive any benefits from it.

The ministry earmarked for Volos: 18 million drachmas for the purchase of land and the broadening of streets; 18 million drachmas for the same purpose provided that the municipality will collect an equal sum from property owners who benefit from the development.

The ministry earmarked for the Nea Ionia municipality: 10 million drachmas for the broadening of streets; 10 million drachmas for street improvements provided the municipality collects an equal amount from property owners who benefit from the developments.

5. IRAKLEION

Present population: 100,000. Projected: 250,000. Irakleion faces a particularly acute problem in city planning. The city spokesmen asked for a balanced growth not only in terms of tourism but also in terms of agriculture and industry. Also, they want to avoid an over-concentration in downtown; instead, with the incorporation of 3,500 homes currently outside the city limits, the city will have an orderly development from now on.

Another point made by the residents is the transfer of the airports or a change in the landing and takeoff runway because in its present location it is a nuisance and impedes the city's development. The Moat of the Fortress which today is under the control of the Antiquities Service must be developed so that both the Fortress will be highlighted and the area will be used for recreation, considering how overcrowded the center of the city is. To relieve the downtown area, it has been found necessary to remove certain establishments such as are industries, or the tourist agencies which attract a large number of people, etc.

They also asked for an expansion of the industrial zone because the existing one is no longer sufficient for taking steps to assure space for handicraft industries, and for making the harbor into a major transit center for commercial cargoes.

The ministry earmarked for Irakleion: 25 million drachmas for broadening streets, squares, purchase of land, etc; 25 million drachmas provided that the municipality will collect an equal amount from property owners who benefit from the improvements.

6. KAVALA

Present population, 49,000. Projected, 200,000. The spokesmen for Kavala asked for the delineation of an industrial zone and for a resolution of the issue of "offensive" industries like the Fertilizer Plant.

They also underlined the need to protect the area of "Panagitsa" as a traditional site. (the Technical Chamber will prepare the necessary study) and the need for the rehabilitation of the Kapnapothiki area together with the establishing of a Tobacco Museum. They also asked for the development

of incentives to strengthen the housing clusters which are withering so that they can develop into resort areas.

They also expressed the request for developing a beltway because the national highway today goes through the city and so does all international traffic. They also asked for the construction of a new harbor, etc.

The ministry earmarked for Kavala the following: 20 million drachmas for street improvement provided the municipality collects an equal amount from property owners who benefit from the improvements; 2,500,000 drachmas for children's playgrounds, common use areas, etc.

Basic Problems

Patrai: Circumferential highway, port, decongestion of the downtown area.

Aigion: Expansion of the City Plan, seashore development, connection with Itea.

Ioannina: Traditional handicraft industries, lake, clinics, national road network.

Kozani: Airport, lignite, educational institutions.

Ptolemais: Airport, road connection, City Plan.

Larisa: Layout plan, Pineios, industrial zones.

Volos: Development of port, decongestion, university level schools, Pilion.

Irakleion: City planning, moving the airport to another location, Fortress.

Kavala: Industrial zone, improvement of areas, national highway.

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KARAMANLIS BRIEFED ON PROGRESS OF PUBLIC WORKS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 114 Jun 79 pp 5, 12

[Text] During a meeting under his chairmanship of the Ministry of Public Works, Premier K. Karamanlis was briefed on the progress of public works under the nationwide program of Public Investments. Minister of Public Works N. Zardinidis, Deputy Minister of Coordination I. Palaiokrasas, Deputy Minister of Public Works St. Manos, the ministry's Secretary General Ar. Tsiplos and the premier's technical advisor, Loukas Kyriakopoulos, participated in the meeting.

The premier expressed his satisfaction at the progress of the various projects and gave instructions:

- a. To study the possibility of including in the program the self-supporting projects (through self-financing) which include the connections between Rion and Andirion, Perama and Salamis, the Salonica waterfront avenue, the Stavros-Elefsis boulevard, the Lykavittos tunnel; and to carry out the studies on feasibility, cost and time [required for their completion].
- b. To promote as rapidly as possible the works which have been included in the Athens Zoning Plan and whenever possible complete them before the end of 1979, even if the cost exceeds the established limits. He also gave instructions to draft in cooperation with the Ministry of Coordination the 1980 Plan in the context of the country's economic possibilities as well as those provided by the induction into the European Economic Community.
- c. To study the possibility of constructing metal overpass intersections whenever it is impossible to construct permanent facilities rapidly. He gave priority to the intersections of Khamosterna and Petros Rallis.

New Legislative Bills

The premier also expressed strong interest in the implementation of the new bills which were enacted by the Chamber of Deputies concerning the institutional framework for the implementation of public works (studies,

price revision, etc.) for their sound and speedy construction. With regard to the new bill "On Prices" which is implemented by Public Utilities and which has been introduced in the Chamber of Deputies, Karamanlis gave instructions to issue a presidential decree or a ministerial decision for the immediate solution of the problem in order to overcome delays pending enactment and in order to stop the incessant digging up of the streets by the Public Utilities.

The meeting dealt also with the projects which are part of the Athens Zoning Plan for improving the traffic situation. These projects are:

1. The widening of Kifissia Avenue and the construction of overpass connections with Katekhakis Avenue and the Siders of Khalandri. Final plans must be submitted before the end of 1979 while the project is expected to be completed by the middle of 1981.
2. Kymi Avenue. To avoid the demolition of apartment buildings as a result of rerouting the avenue in the area of the Pevki community, the completion of the plans was extended to the end of 1980. It was also decided to improve the connection of Kymi Avenue with downtown Athens by constructing a tunnel to connect it with Eptazofos Avenue.
3. The Inside Loop. The final plans should be delivered in stages by early 1981.

An effort is also being made to reduce congestion on Syngrou Avenue in the section beyond the Plix plant by opening Pendelis Avenue from Lagoumitsi Street as far as the First Cemetery in order to channel the traffic toward the avenues of Vouliagmeni, Ilioupolis and Pangrati.

With regard to the other projects included in the plan, their priority in terms of planning and implementation will be determined following its approval.

Sewage-Drainage Projects for Athens

During yesterday's meeting the participants reviewed the flood control projects under construction in the Attiki Basin at a cost of 1,240 million drachmas, with 70 percent of the funds already being consumed. These projects include the widening of the Kifisos River as well as the opening of earth-filled streams in Athens.

There was also mention of the sewage-drainage projects directly related to the governmental decision to abolish within 2 years the Skhistos Wastes Center and the approval of a 350-million drachma loan to the Capital Drainage Organization [OAP] for the construction of basic waste collection sites in Athens. It was also reported that an international low bid competition is planned for a Primary Purification Center in Akrokeramos of Keratsini and that in order to solve the problems of the "Mavouza" [cesspool] a coastal

waste collector will be constructed. It was also underlined that a decision by the Union of Municipalities and Communities is expected concerning the location of a biological purification facility, as well as its proposals within 10 days for repairing the pipeline of the Wastes Center.

As of this moment, on the other hand, the following projects are under construction in Athens:

1. The widening of Athens Avenue. It will be completed by the end of September 1979.

b. Syngrou Avenue: The underground passages for pedestrians will be ready in early October.

c. Delta intersection: It will be finished by September except for the level street section.

Speaking on the Falirikon Delta projects, the premier gave instructions to activate the various responsible agencies and contractors to finish as soon as possible their part of the projects.

d. Extension of Vouliagmeni Avenue.

e. The sum of 385 million drachmas has been appropriated for projects in the Greater Athens area and for street maintenance.

f. Metal overpasses. The results of the close bidding for the construction of the first metal overpass at the intersection of Kifisos and Athens Avenue will be announced on 14 June.

g. Attikon Park: It was decided that following completion of the tree planting and landscaping work in the main area of the park, the landscaping and planting will be extended to the area of Galatsi, with the installation of lights throughout the area.

h. Traffic lights: The premier also gave instructions for the installation of traffic lights in certain key arteries for improving and modernizing the entire system.

Special attention was given at the meeting to the improvement of certain parts of Vouliagmeni Avenue-Anavyssos Street. It was decided to start work immediately in all sections where this is possible.

In the Rest of the Country

The premier was also briefed on the progress of the following projects under construction in the rest of the country:

a. Ninety-two road improvement and maintenance projects, while continuing at a rapid pace construction projects on the basic highways of Patrai-Pyrgos-

Olympia-Igoumenitsa-Preveza-Salonica-Serrai-Alexandroupolis-Ferres-Kastanies-Petritsi-Livadeia-Delfoi-Thermopylae-Itea, etc.

- b. Thirty-four harbor projects, 20 of which will be finished within 1979.
- c. Twenty-one projects for improving and completing terminal facilities in 21 airports. The reconstruction of buildings at the Mikes Airport damaged by the earthquake has been completed.
- d. Forty-two land improvement projects, especially in the Serrai, Arda of Evros and Gianitsa flatlands.
- e. Flood control projects on 82 torrential streams.
- f. In the water supply and sewage sector 35 projects are under construction. Most important among them is the Athens water supply project from Mornos at a total cost of 16 billion drachmas and the Salonica water supply project from Aravissos Springs estimated to cost 1 billion drachmas. They are expected to be completed before the end of the year.
- g. More specifically, with regard to the Athens water supply from Mornos, Public Works Minister Zardinidis stated that a test of water flow into the Marathon reservoir will take place around the end of August or the beginning of September.

According to the contractors, the delay in finishing the project was due to the truckers' strike and the cement shortage. The contractors are asking for a 2-month extension for delivery but the ministry has not yet made a decision on this matter. Zardinidis added that the Yliki water reserves are more than enough to meet the Athenians' needs during the summer.

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PAPANDREOU OUTLINES ENERGY POLICIES

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 22 Jul 79 p 3 AT

[Text] PASOK Chairman A. Papandreou has asked for the government's resignation and has described such an act as the only service the government can offer the country. On the occasion of his statements about the energy problem, the PASOK chairman asked for the government's resignation because its policy has gone bankrupt in the energy field too. Papandreou claims that both the more general absence of an independent national energy policy and the government's reneging and scandalous favoritism of the economic oligarchy have created the current situation regarding our country's energy problem which consists of:

--A very expensive development from the energy point of view;

--A luxurious and uneconomic structure of the forms of energy that are used in our country;

--The use of oil for 75 percent of our energy, with the result that imported energy amounts to 78 percent.

In his statements, the PASOK chairman asks why the explorations for local sources of energy are covered in complete darkness. He demands to know how large the Thasos Oilfield is. At first, it had been announced that 100,000 barrels could be pumped daily; in 1975, the figure was reduced to 25,000 barrels.

Is the Conoco N.A. Oilfield at Limnos a fact, and how large is it? Are there, yes or no, other oilfields near Limnos? Has Romanian Rompetrol (according to) the magazine NOOY ROYAL [as published], September 1977, discovered a natural gasfield in the Nestow River Delta? What is the situation regarding the natural gas of the Kavala South field? Why have explorations in the northern Aegean essentially ended?

Accusing the government of suspicious arbitrariness in the field of nuclear energy, Papandreou claims that it is absurd to announce the immediate

promotion of an installation for a nuclear reactor to produce electricity when nuclear technology is not sufficiently developed, nuclear energy in itself has not solved the energy problem on an international scale, indications of the existence of significant uranium minerals in our country do not recommend a systematic exploration, or is exploration taking place secretly on behalf of foreign interests.

Nuclear energy is intended only for the production of electricity. According to the public power corporation plan and the viewpoint of the National Energy Council, in 1988-1990 local sources will supply 88 percent of the primary forms of energy for the production of electricity. That is, nuclear energy would be required to supply 12 percent of the electricity, which would correspond to about 2.5 percent of all energy.

The cost for the construction of a 900 megawatt nuclear unit corresponds to the construction of 15 300-megawatt units operating with lignite or coal. If the huge expenditure that will be necessary, actually in foreign exchange, were channeled to research, perhaps the problem could be solved.

Papandreou proposes a long-term energy policy based on: complete regional planning and development, something that is identical with a correctly planned energy policy; the development of the local energy sources, something that presupposes an immediate census of energy and of our mineral wealth; intensive explorations for their best possible use and the promotion of exploratory work for the discovery of new deposits. The goal will be to utilize even the smallest local energy source within the framework of planned economic choices.

The long-term energy policy will also be based on a parallel effort to discover raw materials for energy, but without blackmail from countries which do not belong to the imperialist camp and in cooperation with various agents of foreign technology for the reduction of the danger of economic and political dependence, and on the development of a multi-lateral, composite energy system regarding forms and sources of energy.

'RIZOSPASTIS' LAUDS POLISH-GREEK COOPERATION

Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 19 Jul 79 p 2 AT

[From "Radical" column: "The Polish Proposal"]

[Text] The proposal of the government of the People's Republic of Poland, submitted to Commerce Minister Panagiotopoulos by the Polish deputy minister of commerce and merchant marine [as published] is good for our country from every point of view. It gains special significance today when the ever-increasing energy crisis in the capitalist countries has severe repercussions upon our own economy which is dependent upon them and when Greek agricultural products meet increasing restrictions in West European markets.

Poland proposed to install thermoelectric units to be used in the production of aluminum and alumina using Polish mineral coal as fuel. The cost of the projects will be met through export of Greek agricultural products to Poland. It is a good omen that, as reported, the Greek government considers the Polish proposal positive. It would have been an even better omen if the government, which has made certain positive steps in the last few years, proceeded to an all-sided development of our economic and other inter-state relations with the socialist countries.

The limits for development of cooperation are inexhaustible on the part of the socialist countries--this has also been established during summit bilateral meetings--and there is also an obvious desire and good will. Our country will be the one to benefit the most from such tightening of relations. Our economy will be able to get the necessary mechanical equipment, fuels (until it can exploit its own energy resources) and rich technological assistance at extremely good prices and conditions since, nearly in all instances the socialist countries accept payment of the entire or part of the price with agricultural goods. In this way the vast market of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries will provide an outlet to all our exportable agricultural products which will stop rotting like peaches and oranges on the trees and they will cease to be buried, like the sweat of the farmers, in the fields.

NEW LAW ON AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES ANALYZED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 15 Jun 79 p 2

Text The new law on agricultural cooperatives as passed by the Chamber of Deputies and published in the Government Gazette (Vol. I, Issue 125) will go into force as of 1 September 1979. In an announcement yesterday, Agriculture Minister Boutos highlighted the main provisions of the law as follows:

First, the institutionalization and development of the agricultural cooperative in all sectors of productive manufacturing and commercial procedure. The activities which are defined in detail by the new law start with the production, collection, standardization, packing, transportation and marketing of the agricultural products and goes as far as the establishment of handicrafts and industries for processing these products and the establishment of consortiums for selling the products of their members in the domestic and foreign markets. In addition to these activities the new law allows the agricultural cooperatives to form or participate in corporations or limited liability companies, to establish insurance companies and industrial complexes for making or repairing agricultural machinery, etc.

Second, the new law urges and encourages the establishment of "group business adventures" in the agricultural, animal breeding, fishing and foresting sectors, as well as the establishment of model agricultural business by the agricultural cooperatives.

Third, the new law provides the possibilities for creating gradual infrastructure for accumulating self-capital for self-financing the activities of the cooperatives. This infrastructure is based on the right of those belonging to agricultural cooperatives to acquire, in addition to the shares they get as members of the cooperatives, extra shares as an investment deposit of their money which is presently extant in the agricultural area seeking an opportunity for good investments.

Fourth, the new law establishes self-control. The financial and administrative control will be carried out by auditors of cooperative form who eventually will assume the control exercised today by the Agricultural Bank.

Fifth, distribution of profits in proportion to total transactions of each member is another measure provided by the new law and will become an incentive for furthering the transactions of the members through their cooperatives.

Sixth, the new law prevents the fragmentation of the cooperative forces in a village or area. According to the new law, it is permitted to establish an agricultural cooperative if 10 individuals sign its constitution. However, for the establishment of a second cooperative in the same area, at least 100 individuals none of whom belongs to the first cooperative must sign the constitution. As concerns the establishment of a second union in the same area the decision of the general membership meetings of 20 cooperatives is needed. Thus, the phenomenon of having two or three cooperatives in the same village or town for the same purpose will be abolished.

Seventh, the new law creates unions of professional character in the agrarian area whose aim is to represent the interests of the farmers, while the unions in each place can establish for every productive branch or for certain similar products a trade union which will protect the interests of the producers. These organizations, if properly structured, will be able to represent their corresponding organizations in EEC.

Eighth, the new law institutes necessary tax exemptions for the unimpeded developments of the activities of the agricultural cooperatives and provides sufficient economic assistance for the cooperative education and functioning of the machinery of the Panhellenic Supreme Confederation of Unions of Agricultural Cooperatives.

MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM: COMMENT ON WEAKNESSES, PROBLEMS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 20 May 79 p 10

[Article by Mikh. Zouvelos]

[Text] In our elucidation of this subject, we will deliberately avoid any reference to specific legal provisions, so as to not give the impression that this is an investigation of an inner-judicial nature. Our purpose is to give an understanding of the problems which exist today in this sector, especially for the benefit of the "non-specialists," for those whose knowledge about the functioning of the military courts and of the military judicial services is rudimentary or erroneous.

This also affords the opportunity to make a comparison with the procedures of the civil justice system and to dispel the misunderstandings which exist about there being an identity of rights, obligations, and above all of safeguards between the military judges and their civilian colleagues.

Organization

The body of the military justice system consists of two branches which have a common supreme command. One branch is that of the (military) judge advocates (the avoidance of the term 'judges' is not accidental), and the other is that of the court clerks.

This common body is headed in judicial matters by the lieutenant general who is president of the Review Court, and in administrative matters by the major general who is the commanding officer for legal affairs of the Armed Forces Command.

This supreme hierarchy is supplemented by another seven examiners, who are members of the Review Court or who serve in administrative positions, without the double exercising of functions being impossible. Such administrative positions are those of the commanders of the offices of legal affairs of the army, navy, and air force.

The judge advocates of the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd classes and the assistant judge advocates of the 1st class, regardless of their official commission, wear the uniforms and have the insignia corresponding to the ranks of captain up to colonel.

They serve either in the military courts as presiding judges, (military) prosecutors, or examining magistrates, or in various administrative positions.

In peacetime, seven military courts are in operation throughout the country which are called "standing" courts in contrast to the "special" courts which appear in times of disturbance.

There are also one military court for the air force and an admiralty court.

According to a specific law, there is a correspondence with the civilian judges in terms of standing, though not in terms of pay received.

Thus, the assistant judge advocate first class (captain) corresponds to a first-instance court judge, and the president of the Review Court corresponds to the deputy president of the Areios Pagos [Cassation Court], with all the intermediate gradations.

The Command Structure and Dependence

At this point we ought to cite the Constitution, in order to avoid pitfalls and also to show what the facts are.

Article 96 talks about the independence of the military justice system, which is to be instituted by means of a special law. Four years have not been enough time for this law to be passed, and the outlook for its passage is not at all optimistic.

(The initial democratic enthusiasms are always followed by conservative restraint).

Thus even today the previous status quo is in effect of this system's dependence--in various forms--on a purely military command, the exception being the genuinely judicial workings of the inquiry and of the proceedings in the courtroom.

But even in these cases the command structure (the non-judicial part) intervenes in various ways.

In the inquiry, by the granting of a kind of permission for prosecution or else by suppressing it completely by way of the preliminary hearing and direct admission to the courtroom. In the main proceedings, by appointing (by name) up to four military court-martial members from combat units to the five-membered make-up of the military courts. But the supreme command of the courts--the administrative and part of the judicial--does not belong to the president of the Review Court, but to the appropriate commanding general at whose headquarters the military court is located.

This person, and only he, has the right to initiate criminal prosecution, and without his order no criminal proceedings can begin.

For the legal questions which arise there is the office of legal affairs of the corresponding general unit, which is usually staffed by a judge advocate 1st class and his assistants.

Up to the time of the 7-year dictatorship, there was no distinction of ranks--aside from lieutenant generals--in connection with the initiating of criminal prosecution by the army corps commander.

But by a law which was passed at that time and which is still in force today, the right to initiate criminal prosecution of top-ranking commissioned officers from the rank of brigadier general on up was transferred to the commander of the armed forces.

One deficiency which existed then continues to exist today. There is no legal provision for who has the right to bring criminal prosecution against the commander of the armed forces himself.

Other forms by means of which this dependence presents itself in a dominant way are in the matters of transfers, promotions, and retirements, which we will look into below.

Finally, it must not be overlooked that the military courts constitute structural military units.

The Double-natured Existence of the Military Judges

They are both judges and officers. But first and foremost officers.

They try military personnel and are tried by them. They are at one time judges and at another time merely officers. They are members of a staff or administrative employees of a not entirely military service!

Only during the performance of their judicial duties do the military judges have a specific disciplinary jurisdiction and are then assigned to a council of examiners. For the general obligations of an officer, they come under the standard military regulations.

Thus they can be disciplinarily punished by any superior, administrative or of a combat unit, by the general, the commander, the minister, and in fact with punishments of detention or imprisonment!

They assume duties of a service officer or security inspector, they review reserve troops, and they make inspections of sentry posts.

Lack of Continuity in Judicial Duties

Many studies and articles have been written in the past on the need for introducing specialist criminal judges in the civil justice system. The

criminal judge is concerned with people rather than with property matters. Special training, particular fields of knowledge, and above all experience which he acquires by performing his duties over many years are all needed. But also, subjectively considered the continued performance of these duties forms his personality and makes professional and social demands on him.

And if the establishment of this institution in the civilian justice system is difficult, in the military system it would be something simple, since the military judges are criminal judges only. But the one thing which they cannot acquire is continuity in the performance of their duties and the maintaining of the title of judge.

The judge advocate can serve in succession as examining magistrate, presiding judge, prosecutor or legal adviser in administrative positions. Today, "military judges" are being assigned as legal advisers to the general staffs, to the Officers' Autonomous Construction Organization (!!), to the Directorate of Disabled Soldiers, to the Directorate of Civilian Personnel, to the Directorate of Works and Billeting, and to other services which surely do not have any connection with the criminal justice system.

If the judge advocate begins his career in these services and is promoted on a regular basis, he can suddenly find himself presiding judge or prosecutor of a military court, without any prior judicial service.

But there is also something worse--to begin as an examining magistrate, to continue as a prosecutor and to end up as a legal adviser in a service unconnected with the judicial services.

The supposition that this does not have a psychological effect on the person himself and on the general interests of justice is something which only those who have no knowledge of the distinctive nature of the "magistracy" of a judge can maintain.

We did not use the word "function" because the relevant law on judicial functionaries does not include the military judges.

No special proceedings, boards, or previous notice is needed to make these changes. An order signed by the commander of the armed forces is sufficient.

Of course, the law can now say that the appointments of military judges are to be made by presidential decree, but these are details, and new laws are also being issued without the previous ones being abolished.

It is not at all uncommon for the military judge to have as his superior in his new administrative position an officer whom he has subjected to an inquiry or whom he has tried.

And a combat officer is now supposed to rate his professional fitness. And if this seems natural, it would in any case cause a sensation if a member

of the judiciary were empowered to rate the combat fitness of the officers of the armed forces branches.

The Lack of a Prosecutory Principle

Among the general public, the prosecutor is identified with the public prosecutor. This is a fundamental mistake. The prosecutor has the power of criminal prosecution. The prosecutor does not.

He cannot take acceptance of charges filed, and he is not able to order an inquiry or a preliminary hearing.

He becomes involved only when he receives the order for an inquiry from the general commander, who also designates the punishable acts.

In case he has an opinion of his own about the commission of a crime, he will have to report it and wait for prosecutory action to be initiated.

A great difference of opinion arose in the past over whether in this case the exercising of criminal prosecution is obligatory. The negative point of view prevailed. Thus, in many cases the order which followed the relevant request said in writing: "We do not concur." Without there being any explanation and without chance of appeal.

There is no separate class of prosecutor of course, since as mentioned above the judge advocate can be an examining magistrate, a prosecutor, or an administrative officer.

At this point it ought to be stressed that as a rule those generals who exercise criminal prosecution follow the advice of their judge advocates with respect to the scope of their rights. But there are also deplorable exceptions. Such as that of the (now retired) general who after the change in government sentenced with imprisonment the prosecutor of a provincial military court and ordered his confinement in a detention cell.

It is said that this was caused by a disagreement on a legal question. It was not learned whether the penalty was carried out. In any case, the prosecutor was soon transferred.

Safety Valves

The law-maker, in wanting to restrict the decision-making power of the person who can avail himself of criminal prosecution, stipulated that with certain provisos such a person can avail himself of it or not, but in the former case he cannot countermand the order. Only the Judicial Council is now responsible for the committing to trial or not of the defendant. Also there exist restrictions when the same person orders the preliminary hearing, as well as in the direct presentation of felony

cases in the courtroom. Of course, the last stipulation has not been observed for some time now, because it is valid only in peacetime. And today we find ourselves in a belligerent situation! (With whom?) Or, in legal terms, in a state of general mobilization.

(From 1939 up to the present, the military courts have not recognized even one day of "peace." They would have either a general mobilization or a partial one. Or a state of siege. For 40 years now! That is not a short length of time).

Another safety valve, of a more esoteric nature, was the right of appeal against judicial decisions on proceeding to trial, either by the prosecutor or by the defendant.

Even here, however, some people have forgotten!!

By Article 4 of Law 2766/54 (we are making an exception to the non-citing of laws, because of its significance), it was stipulated that the right of appeal against such judicial decisions was to be discontinued for 1 year. By the Royal Decree of 17 February 1955, this suspension was prolonged until 6 March 1956. (But why must we be worn out with yearly extensions?) By Article 10 of Law 3459/55, the suspension "was extended beyond 6 March 1956." (This 'beyond' apparently refers to eternity, because it is still in effect and will continue to be in effect).

Thus, if for example the prosecutor disagrees with a dismissal decree, the only thing which he can do is...to wax philosophical about it!

And since all invalidations can be submitted until such time as the judicial decision becomes irrevocable, there then being no way of submitting this motion (since it cannot be appealed), there are therefore no invalidations. Another safeguard is the special article of the Military Penal Code which punishes whoever interferes illegally in the military justice system.

No mention is made in the chronicles of anyone being convicted for this violation. We will have to assume that it has not needed to be implemented.

Safeguards For Judges and prosecutor.

The civilian judges have life tenure.

The prosecutors are not removable.

The military judges? Let us examine this question:

a. Transfers are made by order of the commander of the armed forces, following a recommendation by the commanding officer of the office of legal affairs of the Armed Forces Command. There is no other procedure.

b. Disciplinary punishments. (In accordance with the general military regulations, when it is not a question of an offense in connection with judicial duties). Imprisonment, detention, confinement.

c. Statutory penalties. By Article 45 of Presidential Decree 308/75, judge advocates can be committed over to courts of inquiry (not judicial councils) on the basis of Law 1400/73. (Evidence-gathering). For "unseemly conduct, violation of secrecy, every act constituting an offense (???), every action or act of propaganda directly or indirectly aimed at... diminishing the national spirit of the Greek people (???), and so forth." (Possible outcome: Suspension from duty, dishonorable discharge).

d. Promotions. All judge advocates are promoted by non-judicial councils, upon the recommendation of the commander of the office of legal affairs, who has one vote in six.

By a basic law, one criterion is also the personal opinion of each member of the council with respect to the person being reviewed, without their being obligated to give any justification for this opinion.

2. Possibility of the submission of a special statement of discharge in exceptional cases.

(Here ends the section on judicial safeguards!)

Specific Problems

a. Non-implementation of Article 96 of the Constitution. Article 96 of the Constitution concerning the independence of the military justice system was passed in the time of enthusiasm for the return of normalcy. This meant granting of safeguards, assigning of criminal prosecution to the prosecutor (obligatory justification of verdicts (today, 'not guilty' or 'guilty' is sufficient), and a majority verdict by the military judges on the bench. But the second paragraph of the same article took away what the first one granted.

"The commencement of validity of these provisions will be fixed by law." Such a law has not been passed up to the present. Some studies and recommendations have been made, but they met with a hitch somewhere.

b. The state of general mobilization. Presidential Decree 506/74 continues to be in effect. We are still in a state of general mobilization.

This fact will be unknown to many people. As well as the fact that, in accordance with the state which the country is in, the penalties are scaled up in most of the military crimes. They are altered automatically from misdemeanors to felonies "when the country is in a state of siege or of general mobilization."

And the old law-makers are not to blame for anything. A logical sequel to general mobilization is war. They surely did not have in mind a general mobilization lasting for 5 years in expectation of a possible war. Nor even the possibility of their giving names to states of affairs which do not exist.

Draft evasion--death, desertion--death, insubordination--death, theft, embezzlement--life imprisonment, intentional causing of disability--imprisonment, disobedience to an order for departure--death, violation of a military command (for example, driving a military vehicle without travelling orders)--imprisonment, abandonment of a sentry post--imprisonment.

Is there anything more serious? And yet there is. In the state of general mobilization, certain occupational categories of citizens are considered to have acquired a military capacity without their having to transfer out of their position and being enlisted.

But they are placed under the military penal law. And they can be charged with desertion if they are absent without leave for more than 2 days. And of course the civilians, very properly--even if against the law--"live in peace," but nothing rules out the possibility of a phenomenon once again appearing like that of a service which brought charges against two private citizens for desertion in 1976. (We had our work cut out to find legal maneuvers to get their release!)

Naturally, only in theory can these penalties given above be imposed, but even with all the reductions and extenuating circumstances which are provided for, the minimum penalties come to imprisonment. Thus, Article 30 Paragraph 2 of the Penal Code necessarily began to be implemented which stipulates that: "The particulars of the case which by law magnify the blameworthiness of the crime are not imputed to the perpetrator if he is in ignorance of them."

Today, the military courts assume that no soldier knows that the penalties are increased in a general mobilization!! What judge would be able to sentence anyone who stole a few cans of food to 10 years in prison?

Nonexistence of Jurisprudence in Military Courts and Review Court

Aside from isolated cases and decisions, jurisprudence does not exist. For the simple reason that there is no obligation to make a justification for the verdicts handed down.

Thus there cannot be a uniform implementation of the law, and in each case there are differing opinions, resulting in the issuing of contradictory verdicts.

Procedural Problems

The need for a modernization of the military criminal procedure was finally realized, and 2 years ago a committee was formed in which members of

the Arcios Pagos took part, which issued a special report. Up to today, its proposals have not been put into practice, and very few people know even what they are.

The implementation of a common criminal procedure would be the most desirable solution--with the necessary modifications--but this presupposes the implementation of Article 96 of the Constitution, and this poses an obstacle. But in any case, since the military courts continue to try in addition to military crimes also cases of common criminal law, they cannot ignore fundamental rights of the defendant such as that of appearing at the inquiry with a defense counsel, appeal against judicial decisions on proceeding to trial, and an explanation of the verdicts.

Although at this point the problems of the military justice system have not been exhausted it is essential to stress that the weaknesses which have been noted do not necessarily mean that they are affording a pretext for the abuse of rights on the part of those to whom they have been granted.

On the contrary, the general rule is their element of self-restraint.

The major issue is that those who have the right can if they wish distort the correct dispensation of justice.

What is indisputable is that if back in the past the safeguards had been granted--not only those which Article 96 of the Constitution provides for today, but also those of ordinary judges--the military courts could not even have been exploited by the dictatorship. The view that in a troubled period of time these safeguards could be lifted is not valid, because they were not removed from the civil justice system. Of course, the roundabout way can be implemented, as it was implemented for the success of the intended goals. But it is a more difficult method than a prepared body of laws which can serve in an absolute way.

With a little good will, the State would be able to create an independent military justice system headed exclusively by judges who would be able to perform their duties without insecurity.

There still exist adherents, even if on a limited scale, of the theory which in the past concerning courts of expediency, this could be the case, because nothing rules out the possibility of these same people going to taste the bitter fruits of this expediency.

It is in fact the newly formulated principle of the impossibility of a repetition of such events is contrary to historical reality.

MILITARY PROMOTIONS, RETIREMENTS CRITICIZED AS BASED ON POLITICS

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 20 May 79 p 10

[Article by Gen Dim. Khondrokoukis, Retired, Deputy of Panhellenic Socialist Movement]

[Text] For officers' reviews, especially of senior and most particularly of top-ranking officers, there has always prevailed as a standard for such reviewing the so-called "golden trinomial of merit rating," according to written and unwritten rules (laws, decrees, orders of an administrative nature, and so forth). Combat action, character, and education. For the post-dictatorship period, it is certain that a fourth component of merit ratings is being added which is derived from the dictates of the Constitution itself: Allegiance to the legal system. Thus the "golden trinomial" becomes a "golden quadrilateral." Furthermore, these yearly reviews, which begin from the top of the military pyramid and descend on down from there, aim at facilitating the natural flow of the military lists, in such a way as to keep officers from getting bogged down in the same ranks--something which causes the officers to become stifled and which creates a decline in morale, which is so necessary for forging the combat readiness of the armed forces.

It is indisputable that the dictatorship, through its reckless advancement of new officers, created a sort of overheating of aspirations for rapid promotions, which finally ended in retirements of generals without their having fully completed their pensionary period!

The unhealthy condition of the military lists, which came about very rapidly, has led to intermittent and ill-considered measures by the General Staffs, such as those measures which had to do with the doubling of the pensionary time for officers who served in combat units. But this downgraded the significance of those war years for which alone the doubling of the time of service is permitted in the calculation of the pension. On the other hand, they were compelled to apply the brakes to the rate of promotions, with the result once again that officers found themselves in the same rank for 10 or 12 years. Thus the unhealthy phenomena in the military lists were dealt with by means of...aspirations.

There have been 5 years now of post-dictatorship government, and the lists are in a dangerously bad condition. Instead of rolling along normally with retirements from the highest level of the leadership, it is sagging at the top. Never in the chronicles of Greece--nor of any other state, Eastern or Western--have chiefs of staff held their posts for more than 2-3 years. No matter how capable they may be, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces are not permitted to blunt the lists for any reason, political or military. A progressive supersession is imposed on the basis at all times of not letting it happen that there are all new people in the top positions of the pyramid or people of the same graduating class from the functioning military schools. Today, the top leadership is occupied by a lieutenant general of the class of 1940 and the other lieutenant generals, vice admirals, and [air force] lieutenant generals are of a junior class. The chief of the Army General Staff is the only one from the class of 1942, and next in succession there are two lieutenant generals from the class of 1943, the others being from the classes of 1947 (one or two), and those recently promoted are from the class of 1948. If it is taken into consideration that attendance at the Military Academy was incomplete for the classes of the occupation years (from 6 months up to 3 years), the lieutenant generals of the 1947 or 1948 classes will not as yet be eligible on retiring now to have a full complement of pensionable years.

And these things show a lack of serious handling of these lists, which in their unhealthy state are fraught with dangers, because all the coups from the formation of the Greek State up to the present have always had their cause in the bad condition of the military lists. A proper minister of national defense ought to have as his foremost duty the stabilizing of these lists and of their natural flow. Unfortunately, everything in this country is done empirically and by party criteria, particularly in these matters, and are exceedingly sensitive.

As a rule, as many officers ought to depart by way of retirement each year as the number of officers who graduate from the Military Academy, when the lists have first been stabilized. As an example, it should be mentioned that the lists will be developing properly when--given the present promotions according to rank which are in effect--the officer reaches at the rank of colonel, which is considered to be a terminal rank for most of them, at the point when he will have spent a period of 30 years in all the grades of an officer (3 years as 2nd lieutenant, 5 years as 1st lieutenant, 7 as captain, 5 as major, 5 as lieutenant colonel, and 5 as colonel), so that with the addition of the years at the Military Academy and any combat years, he will have completed 35 genuinely pensionable years. At the same time he will have stayed in each rank sufficiently long to become "seasoned," in the barracks, in the postgraduate schools, and on the staffs, so that he reaches the highest level as well as the point for pensioning as a mature individual.

It is not leave out of consideration the need for the representation in the leadership of lieutenant generals in proportion to the different classes,

as well as proportionate to the various branches of military service. And of course this also will be "in the mind" of a proper minister of defense. In the recent annual reviews of officers, from what we read in the newspapers in connection with promotions and retirements of top-ranking officers, neither the components of a merit rating which we referred to above nor the unhealthily exploding lists were seriously taken into consideration.

By way of example, I will mention a few striking cases:

1. Promotion to major general of Brigadier General E. Dailakis, armored corps, who is charged with very grave defects of character: It was he who in addition to his other falsehoods against his colleagues and his superiors, on being asked by the military court concerned with the ASPIDA [Officers, Save Fatherland, Ideals of Democracy, and Meritocracy] case the question "What impression was caused by the speech of the army corps commander, Lieutenant General Tsolakas, in his salutation to Premier G. Papandreou on the occasion of a banquet of officers and of the premier at the Salonica Officers' Club," answered "very distressing" (official minutes of the trial). And one should reflect that at the time when he said these things this general now in active service and an army commander was then a major. Giving testimony about the same person just yesterday at the Court of Appeals was the bombing terrorist Captain Tzarellas, who said that the arch-bomber Panagopoulos told him confidentially: "Mr Dailakis is one of us." Just who is the commander of the 2nd Staff Office of the Army General Staff?

2. Promotion of a brigadier general of the artillery corps to major general (A. Mamarelis). He was initially a defendant in the conspiracy case of the so-called "jajana" movement, which was later annulled, although it is unknown how and why. In the time of the dictatorship, he was one of the most aggressive of the confidants of those in power in the dictatorship.

3. Retirement of Major General G. Avfandis, who as commander of an armored unit during the dictatorship turned his unit against the dictator Papadopoulos--an act for which he was cashiered and imprisoned for many years.

He is the same person who as a major general recently defended Moustaklis, at a banquet in Crete, when a brigadier general currently in active service reviled the hero Moustaklis.

4. Retirement of Brigadier General Zisis, who was well known for his anti-junta activity in the period of the dictatorship, but who did not manage to attend the Staff College because he had been retired in the period of the dictatorship, and when he returned the age limit had caught up with him.

There are also many other striking cases which will soon be brought to the attention of the Chamber of Deputies through a relevant interpellation by PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement], after the reviews are completed for all the ranks, because reports are bringing in evidence of veritable "massacres" of democratic officers of the most elite of our army and in all three branches of the armed forces, on the basis of Junta Law 178/69 and of the officers' qualification records of the dictatorship.

Thus, on the basis of a junta law we are seeing "massacres" of democratic officers, mainly those which did not succeed in graduating from the Staff War College, since they returned after the dictatorship as...overage. For the anti-junta officers, one of the factors of the "golden quadrilateral of officers' merit rating"--that of "higher" education, which by general acceptance is taken to mean graduation from the Staff College--has been having a negative weight. But for those others who advanced under the junta and who were promoted, such as the cases we mentioned above by way of example, where the other three factors of character, republicanism, and combat action are deficient--what will be the excuse here?

The "judges are judged" goes a customary military saying, and the other rankings will also be talked about when the reviews of the remaining ranks of all the service branches are published--through the filter at all times of this golden quadrilateral, and not through that of the "neodemocratic" way of thinking of the judges and the judged.

12114

REF: 4328

EVERT ANNOUNCES MEASURES AT THIRD CRAFTSMEN'S CONGRESS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 12 Jun 79 pp 3, 14

/Text/ In a message to the delegates to the Third Panhellenic Craftsmen's Congress which convened in Salonica, Premier Karamanlis expressed his confidence that the craftsmen will fully utilize the opportunities offered by our induction into the European Economic Community. He also took the opportunity to give assurances that the craftsmen will have increased state support and cooperation in their efforts.

The premier's message was read to the delegates by the Minister of Industry and Energy Milt. Evert who opened the sessions of the congress on Sunday morning at the convention hall of the Salonica International Fair. Evert also announced important government measures in favor of the handicraft industry. The congress showed clearly that the craftsmen are unanimously in favor of the country's induction into the EEC.

Premier's Message

In his message, Premier Karamanlis emphasized the following:

"The Third Panhellenic Craftsmen's Congress takes place at a historic time in our country. Only two weeks ago we signed the treaties for Greece's induction into the European Communities. This event has for the craftsmen and small and medium-size enterprises a very special significance which I would like to emphasize.

"The induction assures for your sector great opportunities and prospects for prosperity and progress. It opens up for you the gates to a huge market in which you can apply your unquestionable abilities, talents and creative imagination, your resourcefulness, good taste and business ingenuity. The induction does not reduce but instead expands your role in the context of our country's overall economic effort, because your sector will not merely operate as an autonomous but also as an additional economic factor in the cycle of European production.

"I am confident that you will take full advantage of these opportunities for your own benefit but also for the benefit of our country. Let me assure you that in this effort you will have greater government support and cooperation than in the past. Already, as you know, significant steps have been taken for a more efficient organization and for technological modernization, for the supply of capital goods, as well as for the cooperation, the funding and the marketing of your products and in general for the production of small and medium-size enterprises. Programs already exist or are in preparation to help you more rapidly expand your productive and business activities, and also to achieve a continuing improvement in the quality of your products, the expansion of their varieties and the strengthening of their international competitiveness. I believe that with your creative initiatives, your diligence and your productive genius, this government support will bear fruit many times over.

"With this certainty I express the wish that your congress will mark a milestone in the history of Greek small business and will respond fully to the demands of our times."

Practical Evidence

The role of Greek craftsmen and small businessmen assumes tremendously important dimensions in the development of the Greek economy following our induction into the EEC. Minister of Industry Milt. Evert underlined this fact in his speech to the Third Panhellenic Craftsmen's Congress. Evert took this opportunity to summarize the measures taken by the Ministry of Industry in support of small business and craftsmen, especially in order to eliminate the shortcomings which are inherent in small and medium-size enterprises and in order to acquire the advantages of large business without losing their individuality and autonomy. He pointed out that the areas where such cooperation can be implemented more effectively include the buying of raw materials, selling, storage, advertising and marketing.

He revealed that the Ministry of Industry has developed a model charter for a corporation, with the participation of the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank /ETVA/ in the ownership of preferred stock up to and including 50 percent of the total capital. The first such corporation will be put into effect within a few days, in the ready-to-wear garment industry. Also, the study for a similar corporation in the shoe industry has been completed.

These small and medium-size enterprises--Evert said--because of their size face certain handicaps (absence of property, narrow credit margin, shortage of skilled personnel, limited promotional ability for their products, inefficient management, family ownership) which make them more vulnerable. To be able to develop smoothly in an economic environment which is mainly involved in exports, larger enterprises and large contracts, they need the coordinated help from four sources: the chamber of commerce, enterprises, lending institutions and the government.

A Series of Measures

The minister further discussed the methods whereby the chambers of commerce and the enterprises themselves can help the development of handicraft industries in our country. He then spoke of the measures taken by the ministry for this purpose. Most significant among these measures are:

- a. The improvement and completion of the special financing process for the handicraft industry which resulted from the 197/78 Decision of the Monetary Commission.
- b. The participation, essential for the first time, of this industry in developmental incentives which have been enacted for the industrial and mining enterprises. This was done with Law 849/78 which provides for various forms of financial assistance to protect the environment and the country's regional development.
- c. The lending of funds as of 1 July by commercial banks to private individuals wishing to construct or restructure multi-story buildings to house small business enterprises in conjunction with the ETVA lending activities.
- d. The creation of the Greek Design Center within the structure of the Greek Organization of Small and Medium-Size Manufacturing Enterprises and Handicrafts /ΕΟΜΜΕΠ/ in order to utilize those forces which can create, using Greek designs, a Greek line and fashion in order to achieve a distinct Greek presence.
- e. The introduction of the system of leasing equipment to small business by a special company which, hopefully, will be organized before the end of the year.
- f. The in-depth study of the question of vocational training which is regarded by the government as one of the most serious problems of processing.
- g. The promotion of the ETVA lending program to small business enterprises, which program has been in operation for the last 2 years and is designed to promote modern, convenient and scientifically organized establishments and which takes the form of four major activities and aims at aiding the sound distribution of handicraft enterprises through the country.

Housing the Handicrafts

The measures taken include:

- a. The establishment of a building complex for handicrafts in the industrial zones of Salonica (three complexes), Irakleion (two complexes), Volos and Kavala. Already, the first Salonica complex has been completed and houses several enterprises of different types.

b. The self-housing program which is being implemented for the first time provides for giving craftsmen small lots of from one to three stramas within the industrial zones.

c. The establishment of traditional art centers for craftsmen to be developed in areas having a lengthy history of artistic tradition in order to maintain and further develop this art.

d. The application in our country of the system of "flatted factories" with several building complexes housing several branches of handicraft enterprises.

Evert then spoke on the role to be played by the banks and emphasized that the banks must acquire a modern banking mentality, abandon their anti-economic and obsolete way of thinking that only real estate collateral offers security for their loans. There are other more significant criteria for an enterprise, especially a small or medium-size enterprise, such as the personality of the owner, the nature and quality of its product, its equipment--criteria which are more important than real estate in determining its borrowing capability.

He further spoke on the progress of offering financing to handicraft enterprises from the special fund and underlined that as of 31 December 1978 the balance of available credit for operating capital was 28 billion drachmas and for fixed capital 5.5 billion drachmas.

In closing he asked the delegates to draft and submit specific proposals on improving the production of the handicraft industry and stated that the government will examine them with favor.

The Speakers

Prior to reading Karamanlis' message, there were speeches by K. Vogiatzis, president of the Athens Chamber of Craftsmen, and by Gogotsis, president of the Salonica Chamber of Craftsmen, who also chaired the congress.

Following the brief message and the opening of the congress sessions by Evert, Gogotsis took the floor and presented the main report in his capacity as chairman of the Organizing Committee.

Vin Gogotsis and Vogiatzis, speaking at the luncheon in the "Makedonia Hotel", underlined the concerns of their business because of the new conditions developing in the area of small and medium-size enterprises following Greece's induction into the EEC.

These concerns, however, they said, may be eliminated and even turned into undimmed optimism for the future if by means of government support the handicraft enterprises themselves move toward their modernization. This may be facilitated by their flexibility and easy adaptability to new

conditions, and also by the determination of their practitioners to survive and go forward in conjunction with a search for and implementation of a special policy in support of the advancement of small and medium-size enterprises.

Those who participated and spoke at the congress included the Minister of Northern Greece Nik. Martis, Deputy Minister of Commerce I. Dimopoulos, Democratic Center Union leader I. Zigdis, Democratic Socialism Party chairman G. Pasmazoglou, Deputies G. Bakatselos and Ar. Katsaounis, EOMMEKH President Alektoridis, V. Petridis, president of the Salonica Chamber of Commerce and Industry, D. Anastasakis, president of the Confederation of Tradesmen and Craftsmen, Avramidis, president of the Panhellenic Exporters Association, and Petropoulos, president of the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry.

Also present were Deputy Ministers of Finance Pan. Bokovos, Transportation G. Moutsios, Secretary General of the Ministry of Northern Greece Valtadoros, Thessaloniki Nomarch Tsakonas and representatives of local authorities.

The "Nakedness" of PASOK

A small incident took place at the opening ceremonies in a clear effort by Panhellenic Socialist Movement /PASOK/ delegates to lower the level of the congress. At the last moment they gave the presidium of the congress a handwritten note containing three names of craftsmen-members of PASOK who wanted to speak on behalf of their party. They even demanded to speak before the participating party leaders Zigdis and Pasmazoglou had a chance to address the congress.

PASOK Deputy N. Athanasopoulos, who was invited by the presidium to address the congress, was "shoved aside" by the delegate of the party's trade organization. In the end, Athanasopoulos, too, insisted that the three craftsmen PASOK members should be allowed to speak.

Following this, the congress chairman ordered the alleged PASOK spokesman to yield the floor since he had no credentials whatever verifying his position as party spokesman. In a dramatic call by the prospective PASOK speaker to the PASOK delegates to leave the congress, only the three craftsmen and the deputy left the hall under the general disapproval of the participants.

It should be noted that before the opening of the congress, an organization friendly to PASOK and KKE(Exterior) distributed leaflets which questioned the democratic character of the congress.

The Topics

The topics discussed during the 3 days of the congress included: credit policies; regional development and distribution of handicraft enterprises;

information and its significance; imports, exports and the balance of payments; and tax policies and tax reforms.

Today, the last day of the congress, discussion was devoted to the drawing of conclusions and to the election of a new organizational committee.

7520
CSO:4908

PROBLEMS IN SALONICA QUAKE RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM REPORTED

Athens KYRIAKATIKI in Greek 17 Jun 79 p 10

[Text] Salonica (from our correspondent, Giannis Liapis)--A whole year after the great earthquake, Salonica does not appear like a "bombed city." Life goes on smoothly on the surface and a foreigner would not detect great changes. The repeated earthquakes, however, and their impact have left their mark on the city's heart. People reside in dangerous buildings. Families live in trailers. Construction activity follows a diminishing geometric progression. Ten thousand people have left the city.

The "face" of the city and of the earthquake-stricken area around it has the following features:

- a. 46,500 buildings in the city and 10,347 in the suburbs have been declared "green" which means that they cannot be inhabited. These buildings represent 184,000 apartments in the city and 15,000 in the suburbs. It is estimated that 100,000 of these apartments need repairs.
- b. 13,300 buildings in the city and 6,107 in the suburbs have been declared "yellow" which means that they can be inhabited but only after necessary repairs are made. They represent 38,000 apartments in the city and 8,000 in the suburbs. According to the latest estimates of former Thessaloniki Nomarch K. Pylarinos, "fifty percent of these buildings should be demolished because it is unprofitable to repair them."
- c. 400 buildings in Salonica representing 1,500 apartments have been declared "red" which means that they are uninhabitable due to the imminent danger of collapse.
- d. 2,800 buildings in Salonica and 3,952 in the area have been considered "demolishable," but the question remains whether 100 have been demolished. The rest of the buildings, representing 11,500 apartments, are occupied.

What is the state or the government doing? It was announced through the Ministry of Public Works that by the end of 1979 loans totaling 1,379,750,000 drachmas will be granted(?) for repairs and conversions. Of this amount,

nearly 299,300,000 drachmas will be given by the state. On the other hand, however, the state has collected in 1978 from the special tax 7 billion drachmas and expects to collect an equal amount in 1979.

According to Coordination Ministry data only 296 million drachmas have been spent for various projects in Salonica--an amount, that is, which is less than 4.5 percent of the collected taxes. It should, however, be pointed out that the government effort was significant in two sectors: in school buildings and in street projects. Using the system of prefabricated units, about 100 new schools were erected in Salonica and its suburbs--more than the city had from the time it was liberated (1912) until 1978, as the Minister for Northern Greece, N. Martis, takes pleasure in saying.

At the same time, Coordination Minister K. Mitsotakis announced during his last visit in Salonica a number of street and road projects which will cost 3,028,000,000 drachmas. But the strange thing is that no bids have yet been asked for 80 percent of these projects.

In the meantime, there is a complete construction standstill and the association of building contractors in Northern Greece has repeatedly warned the government to take measures to remedy the situation. The government responded with apathy to these warnings and has not taken a single measure. As a result the whole construction cycle has been hit very hard. The members of most of the families who deserted Salonica were masons, cement mixers, workers in industries producing construction materials, construction technicians, engineers and architects.

With regard to the conditions existing in the construction sector, F. Kazanis, president of the Association of Greek Industrialists, made the following characteristic statement:

"The impact on local construction activity in general and industry in particular will begin to be felt from now on. We are facing serious dangers."

To prevent these dangers which threaten Salonica's economic life the government has done absolutely nothing.

BRIEFS

TREMORS IN SALONICA 8 June, from our correspondent--An earthquake tremor which registered 3.6 on the Richter scale was felt at 1353 hours today throughout Salonica. The Geophysics Laboratory announced that the tremor originated in the area of the Langada and Volvi lakes, a distance of 30 kilometers from the city. A little later (1430) another tremor having an intensity of 2.5 was felt. It originated in the same area. [Text] [Athens TO VIMA in Greek 9 Jun 79 p 11] 7520

TREMOR IN SALONICA, 12 June--An earthquake tremor having an intensity of 3 on the Richter scale was felt yesterday in the Salonica city area. The tremor was registered at 0919 hours by the Salonica University Geophysics Laboratory and originated at a point 35 kilometers from the city center--its epicenter, that is, was pinpointed in an area between the Langada and Volvi lakes. The tremor was particularly felt in Sokhos and Zangliveri. Also, a tremor of smaller duration was felt Saturday in the Leivadia area at 1405 hours. [Text] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 12 Jun 79 p 16] 7520

PRODUCTION OF GASOHOL PLANNED--A new type of gasoline with alcohol admixture (gasohol) is anticipated to be marketed soon following laboratory research which proved satisfactory. This new fuel will have reduced lead content, a fact which will help to reduce the pollution of the environment. This was announced by Industry Minister M. Evert who added that for this purpose a work group has been established consisting of representatives of the National Energy Council, the Aspropyrgos refinery, the sugar industry and the Agricultural Bank. The group will proceed with the economic and technical investigation of the question from the standpoint of primary production (production of beets), industrial production of alcohol from sugar and finally standardization and production of this new type of fuel. At the same time, the Aspropyrgos refinery is exploring in its laboratories the possibility of using alcohol derived from wood instead of distilled spirits. [Text] [Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 9 Jun 79 p 16] 7520

GERMAN LOAN TO ETVA REPORTED--An agreement was signed yesterday at Dusseldorf whereby the Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale Bank will grant a loan of 15 million dollars to the Hellenic Industrial Development Bank [ETVA]. The loan will be used to finance ETVA's 1979 developmental program. The agreement was signed by ETVA Deputy Governor Rafail Moysis on behalf of Greece and the loan will be paid up in 12 years with a grace period of 5 years at an interest rate of 5.8 percent and without the interbank interest rate in the London Eurodollar Market (LIBOR). [Text] [Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 14 Jun 79 p 13/ 7520

030:4908

OIL PRICE INCREASE: THE PORTUGUESE CASE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Jul 79 pp 17, 18

[Article by Eurico da Fonseca: "Portugal, a Different Problem"]

[Excerpt] It is a tradition with us to confine energy problems to gasoline consumption or, going to the opposite extremes, associate them with the construction of nuclear powerplants. It is also a tendency of ours to imitate foreign solutions, without regard for their causes and effects.

Gasoline rationing, in addition to the tremendous bureaucratic problems and the expense that it would entail, would not reduce our imports, and quite likely would increase them. The same might be said about restrictions such as driving on alternate days, or the setting of lower speed limits.

As a matter of fact, our situation, whether from the standpoint of gasoline consumption or from that of energy consumption as a whole, is quite different from that in countries with a high standard of living and a high rate of industrialization. In those countries, gasoline consumption may amount to 21 percent of the total energy consumption, or nearly 50 percent of the total liquid fuel consumption (as in the United States). To meet a demand of this kind, it is not sufficient to undertake normal oil refining. It is necessary to resort to processes ("cracking," or fractionating) which will make it possible to convert "heavy oils," such as diesel and even fuel oil into gasoline.

The Difference Between '73 and '79

The current situation cannot be compared with the one which existed at the time of the first oil crisis, at the end of 1973. Then, we did not have a sufficient refining capacity: a large amount of the gasoline that we consumed had to be imported. Therefore, even before the crisis, a policy of support for the consumption of diesel oil was being pursued, specifically with regard to private cars, which benefited from substantial reductions in the so-called "tax on vehicles." But, surprising though it may seem, that policy was not changed when our refining capacity became sufficient and we stopped importing already refined gasoline, as a rule. On the contrary,

out of ignorance or demagoguery, a policy of alleged saving on gasoline was adopted, constantly raising the specter of a rationing which had no reason to exist, and consistently increasing prices with a thousand and one more or less imaginary excuses, later including the introduction of financing for the so-called "shopping basket." In fact, these measures only tended to increase public revenue, which was immediately absorbed by the rising costs of administration.

The result was a very sizable increase in the number of private cars operating with diesel oil, the replacement of small trucking vehicles using gasoline (which were numerous) with others using diesel oil and greater utilization of public transportation, which also consumes that fuel.

From the standpoint of 1973, these provisions may perhaps have been over-ly, but not from that of 1978, much less 1979. In the first place, the purchase of diesel driven vehicles (or those with diesel engines to replace those using gasoline) has been reflected in a large supplementary outlay of foreign exchange, which is not offset by the lesser consumption of the diesel engines as compared with gasoline engines. Secondly, and this is most important, the consumption of diesel oil increased by no less than 50 percent between the latter months of 1973 and of 1978; and gasoline imports were replaced by diesel oil imports at an increasing rate. The latest known figures for the first three quarters of 1978 show a total of 197,741 tons of diesel oil imported, to meet a total consumption of 992,927 tons. In other words, close to 20 percent of the diesel oil that we are consuming comes from imports of products that are already refined.

And the worst part of it is that, contrary to what is generally assumed, the real cost of diesel oil is not less than that of gasoline. In some European countries, diesel oil has been sold at the same price, or at a price slightly higher than that of gasoline. But the situation has become worse in recent months, owing precisely to the greater demand for diesel and fuel oil for industry, heating and the production of electricity. At the end of last month, diesel oil was quoted on the Rotterdam market at \$45.80 per 42-gallon barrel (in other words, almost 14 escudos per liter); after having reached \$43.25 on 1 June (almost 15.70 escudos per liter); whereas gasoline was quoted at \$43.25 (nearly 13.20 escudos per liter). And there is reason to believe that the difference will become more marked during the year.

Gasoline and Diesel Oil

Therefore, what we need in Portugal is not a policy of saving gasoline, but rather of saving diesel oil (and fuel oil as well). We cannot expect to be able to save gasoline and then sell it at a good price, thus compensating for the increased cost of diesel oil. It should be realized that the gasoline shortage in the highly industrialized countries is, as has been said, not the shortage of diesel and fuel oil. What is of interest to the companies which supply those nations is not gasoline purchases, but rather purchases of heavy hydrocarbons. Moreover, in any event, to compensate for our imports of diesel oil, we would have to sell nearly 30 percent

of the gasoline that we are currently consuming. This is impossible, and there is no reason to believe that the sale could be made at a compensatory price, or even at any price.

One solution (which has already been cited by the secretary of state for energy and basic industries) is to put an end to the present policy on subsidies, raising the prices of fuel to their real value, based not only on the increase in crude oil prices, but also on the hikes in prices of refined products. In fact, no other course of action appears to be possible; but, once again, it behooves us not to forget that the problem is not limited to the effects of the increase in the cost of gasoline. The rise in diesel oil costs will have serious effects on the prices of fish, agricultural products and many industrial products; whereas the hike in fuel oil prices will also be reflected in the price of electric power.

2909

CSO: 3101

PCP(R) HOLDS CONGRESS, REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR UDP

Porta O PRIMEIRO DE JANEIRO in Portuguese 3 Jul 79 p 3

[Text] Nearly 5,000 persons took part in the closing meeting of the Third Congress of the Portuguese Communist Party (Reformed), which took place on Campo Pequeno in Lisbon, with the slogan "unity and internationalism."

In attendance were delegations from the Marxist-Leninist Communist Parties of Albania, Brazil, Germany, France, Greece, Spain, Italy, Chile, Denmark, Canada, Ireland, Angola and Upper Volta; and messages were sent from similar parties in Colombia, Austria, Venezuela, Dahomey, Togo, Ecuador, Japan and Iran.

Luis Costa spoke on behalf of the PCP(R) Central Committee, accusing several parties of attempting to "involve the popular, democratic forces in commitments with some of the leading agents of the Novembrist policy, led by Eanes."

It may be recalled that the PCP(R) is a pro-Albanian, or Hoxhist (from the name of the head of the Albanian Workers Party, Enver Hoxha), Marxist-Leninist party. It recently underwent a split, during which it was reportedly abandoned by over half of its members, who have now combined in support of the weekly publication, VOZ DO POVO [People's Voice]. The PCP(R) backed the presidential candidacy of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, and participates in the UDP [Popular Democratic Union]. In his remarks, Luis Costa also addressed a "special message" to the UDP, guaranteeing "support for the strengthening of UDP," and rejecting "all positions which run counter to that support." In addition, he submitted the conclusions from the congress which was held recently, and which cite socialism as "the only definitive solution for the ills of the people and the country."

1909

CSO: 3101

COMMUNIST YOUTH GROUPS TO FORM UNITED FRONT

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 7 Jul 79 p 4

[Text] The merger of the Union of Communist Youth (UJC) and the Union of Communist Students (UEC), which was publicly announced last weekend, will become official during a national meeting of delegates from the two PCP [Portuguese Communist Party] youth organizations scheduled for 10 and 11 November of this year. The convening of the meeting was decided upon last Sunday during a joint meeting of the UJC and UEC central committees.

According to a communique released at the conclusion of the latter meeting, "The two central committees concluded that, from the northern to the southern part of the country, the UJC and UEC organizations and militants have held a very lively, extensive and intensive discussion about unification." The same document also explains: "Based on the existence of common goals (regarding unemployment, occupational opportunities, the right to education, combatting drugs, difficulties in establishing households, etc.), the highly constructive experience of engaging in combined initiatives, and the increasing need for coordination of the work between the two Communist youth organizations, both central committees were of the opinion that unification would contribute to an even greater reinforcement of Communist participation in the specific movement of working and student youth."

The Background on the Unification

A month before this communique was released, the last PCP Congress felt that conditions were ripe "for taking actual steps toward the unification of the two Communist youth organizations." The Policy Resolution from the Congress added: "Although they have different organizations, social bases and dynamics, the working youth and student youth groups have countless common problems...and they have participated jointly in many activities and initiatives. Therefore, the UJC and UEC, although they operate in different areas, have tended toward an increasingly close cooperation with regard to many problems and toward common effort in numerous initiatives."

Besides, the notion of unification is not new. At the previous Party Congress (the Eighth), which took place in 1977, the necessity for planning organic ways of intensifying the cooperation between the two Communist

organizations was established. On that occasion, the first step forward was taken to carry out the plan, with the establishment of the UJC's main headquarters on the premises where the UEC was operating. At the same time, the PCP's youth directorates fostered the publication of the idea among the rank and file of their organizations.

How the UEC and UJC Came Into Being

It was stressed that, at the present time, the PCP is the only party which has two youth organizations, one for students and another for workers. The PS [Socialist Party] has only Socialist Youth, the PSD [Social Democratic Party] has the Social Democratic Youth and the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] has the Centrist Youth. The same thing holds true for the foreign parties as a whole.

However, when the PCP came into existence on 25 April, it only had the UEC which, because it was a student organization geared toward work in the schools, could not include major groups of working youth. The party attempted to steer these groups toward the Working Youth Movement (MJT), a Communist organization of a unified nature which came into being at the end of the 1960's, associated with the CDE [Democratic Electoral Commission] movement.

Prior to 25 April, the Communists considered it more feasible to back the organizations of a unified type (such as the MUD [Democratic Union Movement-Youth]) which they easily controlled owing to their militancy. This action facilitated the mobilization of other political sectors to support their initiatives challenging the former regime.

However, because of the dynamics that the student movement assumed in the struggle against the dictatorship, and its own entrenchment at that time, in 1972 the PCP deemed it feasible to set up its own student organization, the UEC.

After 25 April, when the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] was limited to a group of intellectuals, the maintenance of the MJT, in which almost only the Communist working youth continued to militate, ceased to make sense.

So, in March 1975, the UJC was formed as the base for a future Communist youth organization which was to become integrated with the UEC.

New Organization

This "future Communist youth organization" (the name has not yet been decided on, and it is hardly likely that it will keep the initials JC, which could be confused with the centrist organizations) will be officially established at the November meeting. As we were told by Horacio Rufino, head of the UJC, with the unification, an attempt is being made to create a structure wherein the workers will definitely carry more weight than the students. This is

due to two essential reasons: the principle followed by the PCP in all its entities of giving the workers a majority, and the numerical difference in members of the two organizations currently in existence.

Information supplied at the last party congress indicates that the UJC has about 22,900 members, whereas the UEC has approximately 8,600.

In any event, it is agreed that, on the university level, the student sector of Communist youth must operate with a relative degree of autonomy. This is justified by the specific features of the students' organization in higher education.

Horacio Rufino also told us that only 15 percent of the members of the UEC and UJC are affiliated with the PCP. However, Rufino denied that these organizations act as a means of "filtering" new members into the party.

Finally, we want to point out that, although we have received the best cooperation from the UJC for this article, the same thing does not hold true for the UEC leadership. In fact, when contacted by EXPRESSO, the leaders of the Communist students refused to supply any kind of direct information to us because, as they emphasized, they feared a misinterpretation of their statements. These individuals only offered to grant a formal interview (which has not been requested) or to send documentation relating to the subject. We regret this defense of "official information," as well as the lack of understanding shown for the role that is incumbent on journalists to play.

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PCP ORGAN ON EXCHANGES WITH OTHER CP'S

Lisbon AVANTE [organ of the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP)] in Portuguese
5 Jul 79 p 2

[Text] Jesus Faria in Lisbon

On 2 July, Comrade Jesus Faria, secretary general of the Communist Party of Venezuela [PCV], paid a visit to Portugal accompanied by Elizabeth Faria, a member of the PCV's Central Committee. Comrades Jesus Faria and Elizabeth Faria were received at the PCP's Central Committee premises by Comrade Alvaro Cunhal, secretary general of the PCP. Albano Nunes, member of the Central Committee and head of the PCP's International Section, was also in attendance. During the meeting that took place, information and views were exchanged on the situation in Portugal and Venezuela, and on the activities of the respective parties. The two PCV leaders also met with Comrades Carlos Costa, member of the Political Commission and Secretariat of the PCP's Central Committee, and Luis Sa, from the Work Commission for Local Governments; and they visited the Alfama Work Center, where they were received by Marília Cabral, member of the Central Committee; Fernanda Barroso, alternate member of the Central Committee; and Carlos Garcia, member of the Public Sector Agency of the PCP's Lisbon Region Organization Directorate. The exchange of information and views which took place on the occasion of this visit contributed to a better mutual understanding and an intensification of the bonds of friendship and solidarity that exist between the PCP and the PCV.

PCP Delegation Visits Bulgaria

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, a PCP delegation consisting of Carlos Brito and Raimundo Cabral, members of the Political Commission, and Jeronimo de Castro, member of the Central Committee, departed for the Socialist Republic of Bulgaria.

The visit to Bulgaria by the PCP delegation is being made as part of the bonds of friendship, cooperation and fraternal solidarity that typify the relations between the Portuguese Communist Party and the Bulgarian Communist Party.

PCP Delegation's Return from Poland

At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR], a delegation from the PCP headed by Luis Santos, member of the DORL [Lisbon Region Organization Directorate], visited the People's Republic of Poland between 24 and 30 June to study matters relating to domestic trade, the marketing of agricultural and food products and the food industry.

During its stay in Poland, the delegation had an opportunity to become informed on the PZPR's general orientation involving commercial policy and its activity in these sectors. It was received by the Department of Trade, Consumption and Light Industry of the PZPR's Central Committee, the PZPR's Regional Committees of Bialystok and Radom, the Ministry of Domestic Trade, the Ministry of Food Industry, and the Spolem Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives; and it paid several visits to commercial establishments, major warehouses, slaughterhouses, meat packing facilities, factories and other premises, where work meetings were held.

The PCP delegation was also received by Jozef Pinkowski, secretary of the PZPR's Central Committee.

This delegation's visit took place as part of the fraternal and cordial relations that exist between the PCP and the PZPR, contributing further to a reinforcement of the cooperation and exchanges of views between the two parties.

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